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“There is a real tension the government contends
with because it isn’t in a position to do nothing
since that would expose the country to violence.”
This scenario rings especially true when terrorists
live and operate among the population from
which they receive support. “The United States
faces the same dilemma in Iraq,” noted Bueno
de Mesquita. “U.S. forces fear that military
countermeasures against terrorists may be the
spark that ignites mass mobilization rather than
quelling violence.”
Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson employ a
game theoretic model that considers two types
of government: one hard-lined that will retaliate
and one more amenable to negotiation with
extremists. But they found it is very hard to
determine when and what type of government
is more likely to be attacked because many
factors come into play, including a radical
movement’s existing level of support. If the
group already has a strong backing by the
people, it has little to gain from an assault,
even if it thinks it will successfully provoke a
harsh counterterrorism response.
“It’s the interim ranges—where terrorists have
some, but not overwhelming, support and some,
but not overwhelming, reason to believe the
government will crack down—where you expect
to see these movements gaining popular support,”
he said.
While this paper does not provide any “obvious,
simple policy implications,” it does clarify a very
complicated set of issues, including offering a
more nuanced model of the interplay of terrorist
and counterterrorist strategy and demonstrating
different scenarios when government retaliations
may be the good or bad policy.
Bueno de Mesquita noted, “The model doesn’t
yield pat solutions for problems like the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict or the counterinsurgency in
Iraq. Rather, it identifies a set of questions a
government may want to ask itself when
confronting these types of insurgencies.”
Elizabeth Jenkins
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