Charles L. Glaser and Steve
Fetter
National missile defense (NMD) is the most visible and controversial
element of President George W. Bush's defense policy. The Bush administration
has focused its 
case
for NMD on the danger posed by so-called "rogue states," such
as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq that are thought to be working to acquire
long-range missile capabilities. Although less frequently stated, some
proponents of NMD believe the United States should deploy defenses against
China and possibly Russia. University of Chicago Harris School Professor
Charles Glaser opposes the Bush administration's NMD policy. In a forthcoming
article in the journal International Security (Summer 2001), "National
Missile Defense and the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy," Glaser
and co-author Steve Fetter (University of Maryland) argue that
the United States needs to significantly reorient its NMD policy, at
a minimum adopting a variety of more cooperative military policies, and
possibly foregoing NMD entirely.
Glaser, a political scientist, and Fetter, a physicist, conclude that
NMD would increase U.S. security only if the United States could deploy
an effective system without seriously damaging its relations with Russia
and China. Although an effective defense would be of some value against
emerging rogue missile threats, the researchers believe that the security
benefits are exaggerated. Rogue intercontinental-range ballistic missiles
(ICBMs) have yet to materialize, may be delayed or eliminated by diplomacy,
and can almost certainly be deterred if they arise. In comparison, the
potential international political costs of NMD are large. NMD that increases
Russian and Chinese insecurity risks triggering reactions-including arms
buildups and more aggressive foreign policies-that will on balance reduce
U.S. security.
NMD systems are designed to protect the United States from ICBMs carrying
weapons of mass destruction-nuclear, biological, and possibly chemical
weapons. The United States is prohibited by the 1972 Antiballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty-which was originally negotiated with the Soviet Union and
now applies to Russia-from deploying NMD that would protect the U.S.
homeland. Although concerned about the danger posed by rogue states,
the Clinton administration was reluctant to discard the ABM Treaty, believing
that it continued to play an important role in helping to manage U.S.
relations with Russia. In sharp contrast, the Bush administration appears
interested in breaking out of the constraints imposed by the ABM Treaty.
Bush Administration Strategy
In his May 2001 speech on missile defense, President
Bush stated his determination to "leave behind the constraints of
the ABM Treaty" and to deploy NMD as soon as possible. The Bush
administration has not yet decided what technologies should compose
the U.S. NMD system, but it appears inclined toward a layered system
that would combine boost-phase and multiple midcourse systems to
produce a large and robust NMD. Boost-phase systems are designed
to intercept ballistic missiles during the powered phase of their trajectory,
which occurs during the first few minutes after an ICBM is launched;
midcourse systems are designed to intercept warheads after they
separate from the booster rocket and before they reenter the atmosphere.
Glaser and Fetter find the case for NMD far from compelling,
but do not completely reject a role for a limited NMD. If the United
States proceeds with NMD, it should deploy only a surface-based
(land- or sea-based) boost-phase NMD system. Because surface-based
boost-phase interceptors must be located within several hundred kilometers
of potential launch sites, this type of NMD would be unable to
reach missiles launched from deep inside Russia or China and therefore
should pose little threat to their security. A boost-phase system also
could be far more effective than the midcourse system that was planned
by the Clinton administration, because a boost-phase system would intercept
ICBMs before decoys and other countermeasures could be released.
Technical experts have concluded that a state that is capable of deploying
an ICBM will also be capable of deploying countermeasures that will be
able to defeat the planned mid-course NMD. Although Moscow and Beijing
are likely to see dangers even in surface-based boost-phase systems,
since their deployment would require amending the ABM Treaty and would
generate momentum for layered NMD systems, a single layer boost-phase
system has the best hope of minimizing the international political costs
of NMD.
Addressing Russian and Chinese Concerns
In contrast, the researchers argue that there is
a powerful case against proceeding with deployment of midcourse
systems and layered systems that combine midcourse and boost-phase systems.
Unfortunately, the Bush administration appears headed in this direction.
If the United States decides to deploy NMD against China and Russia,
which some proponents favor, then there is little America can do
to moderate the international political costs. If, however, the United
States proceeds with midcourse NMD to protect against rogue states, there
are a variety of approaches for significantly reducing NMD's international
political costs.
One possibility is an arms control agreement in which
the United States eliminates an offensive nuclear warhead for each
defensive interceptor it deploys. If, for example, Russia deploys 2000
strategic offensive warheads, the United States could deploy 1800 warheads
and 200 NMD interceptors. This type of agreement is likely to have greater
symbolic and political value than strategic value, but such considerations
might be key. More important would be U.S. efforts to reduce the
threat that its strategic nuclear forces pose to Russian nuclear forces.
Russian forces are highly vulnerable to a massive U.S. nuclear attack
and Russia fears that the addition of U.S. NMD could undermine its nuclear
deterrent. Russia worries that the United States could attack first and
destroy most of its nuclear force, and negate the strategic value of
any surviving Russian nuclear weapons with its NMD. The United States
can limit the threat posed to Russia by greatly reducing the size and
readiness of its offensive nuclear forces and by committing itself to
building only a small NMD system.
Glaser and Fetter argue that policies for reassuring
China are harder to design because China currently has a very small nuclear
force, which it is preparing to modernize. U.S. NMD will almost certainly
compel China to deploy a larger modernized force. The United States must
recognize that its NMD will have this effect and prepare now not to misinterpret
the Chinese nuclear buildup. The danger is that the United States will
interpret Chinese reactions as aggressive and that China will in turn
conclude that the United States is more aggressive, since Beijing will
view its own buildup as purely defensive. A classic spiral of hostility
would be set in motion, which could fuel other potentially competitive
and conflictual elements of the emerging U.S.-China relationship, including
concerns about the growth of Chinese power and divergent beliefs about
Taiwan's future.
To avoid this downward political spiral, the Bush
administration must explain to the American public and to Chinese leaders
that the United States understands that its NMD is likely to convince
China to build a larger nuclear force. While not encouraging this reaction,
U.S. leaders need to declare that they will accept this nuclear buildup
as consistent with China's security requirements and therefore will not
interpret it as an indication that China's regional or global ambitions
are growing. If clearly stated and widely accepted across the American
political spectrum, this understanding should help China appreciate that
the United States is not turning to NMD to gain military advantages or
to fuel competitive political relations. Working now to establish a domestic
consensus on how China is likely to view U.S. NMD will reduce the likelihood
of misreading China's military response and, in turn, of escalating tensions.
The researchers note, however, that given the current strains in U.S.-China
relations, even dedicated efforts to manage the action-reaction generated
by U.S. NMD will likely be insufficient to prevent misperceptions.
In conclusion, although Glaser and Fetter believe
that the United States should forego midcourse NMD entirely, they conclude
that limited NMD might increase U.S. security if the U.S. energetically
pursues cooperative policies. However, the researchers find that if the
United States moves forward on NMD while failing to pursue such policies
(a possibility that seems likely), NMD will certainly reduce U.S. security.
Research Summaries are designed to help
broaden the dissemination of current policy-relevant
research. These Summaries are funded by the Irving B.
Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies at the
University of Chicago.
For more information, contact Jamie Rosman at HarrisSchool@uchicago.edu or
(773) 702.2287.
