Lloyd
Gruber
The explosive spread of supranational structures, such as the World
Trade Organization (WTO), the European Monetary System (EMS), and NAFTA
is driven by power politics just as much as by efficiency considerations
and positive expectations. Even when cooperation among nations is strictly
voluntary, the resulting arrangements need not be mutually beneficial
for all of the countries involved. In his book titled, Ruling
the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions (Princeton
University Press, 2000), University of Chicago researcher Lloyd Gruber
introduces the concepts of go-it-alone power and institutional
power in order to demonstrate how international cooperation and
institution building can leave some actors - even voluntary ones -
absolutely worse off. Excluding the conventional cases of coercion
and outright bullying, the author advances an innovative approach to
power politics, arguing that under certain circumstances governments
choose to participate in cooperative international arrangements they
very much dislike. In the study Gruber, an assistant professor at the
Harris School of Public Policy Studies, illuminates the decision making
process that takes place when parties of varying power enter mutual
agreements.
Background
Gruber's research directly responds to the neoliberal tradition that
has dominated discussions of international cooperation in the field
of international relations. Scholars ascribing to this theory have
insisted that increased interdependence between nations and the opportunity
for utility gains from voluntary international cooperation are the
reason for the recent proliferation of supranational organizations
and agreements. These scholars also view issues of efficiency as the
driving force behind institutional choice, with founding participants
struggling to choose whatever institutional form will enable them to
effectively respond to market failures, mitigate collective-action
problems, and generally further their common interests.
Key Findings
Gruber accepts the rational choice foundations
of neoliberalism and acknowledges that the possibilities for mutual
gains from cooperation explain much of the observed outcomes. However,
he questions the universal validity of this analysis. In some cases,
Gruber argues, institutionally mediated cooperation may work exclusively
to the benefit of the initiating actors, increasing their power and
prosperity at the expense of other actors who participate only because
they have no better option. The losers in such scenarios fall into
two distinct categories. First, there are governments or countries
located outside the new regime's "enacting
coalition." These actors join the cooperative arrangement because -
and only because - the original (non-cooperative) status quo
has been removed from their choice set.
Once the winners go it alone, the losers are left with a choice between
two unattractive alternatives: participating in the winners' new regime
(the losers' preference for the status quo notwithstanding) or being
altogether excluded from the regime (and incurring even greater losses).
The second category of losers consists of the enactors' internal opponents,
political parties whose constituencies prefer the original status quo
and, if ever elected, would do everything in their power to restore
it.
The established perspective on power suggests
that the states that enjoy a bargaining advantage during the establishment
of a multilateral institution are those who have a higher tolerance
for the pre-cooperation status quo. Gruber notes that bargaining
strength stems also from the capability of some states to alter the
status quo unilaterally. This so-called "go-it alone" power leads to absolute loses for some of the
participants, who voluntary choose to join the cooperative arrangement
since they are faced with an even worse option. Even though the "loser" countries
would choose the status quo that existed prior to the cooperative agreement
as their most preferred outcome, these nations realize that the founding
states who had go-it-alone power have removed that status quo from
the set of feasible alternatives. In other words, the "loser" states
who are left outside of the arrangement after its initial establishing
opt to join because "it is the lesser of two evils." Still, the "loser" states'
most preferred - although unattainable - outcome is a return
to the world in which the cooperative organization does not exist.
According to Gruber, what distinguishes go-it-alone
power from pure coercion is that, in the former case, the power holders
possess a dominant strategy - a choice that is optimal regardless
of the choices made by the others. Still, the author outlines four
necessary conditions for a go-it-alone scenario. First, the good
that the cooperative arrangement aims to provide must appear "bad" to
certain actors. Second, the provision of this good must generate
large negative externalities for non-participants - which is why
they are so eager to participate. Third, the beneficiaries of the
cooperative regime must be able to provide the good on their own,
that is, without any contribution from the losers. Lastly, the prime
movers cannot be worse off if additional actors join the agreement.
The author emphasizes that even though his argument is a conditional
one, none of the necessary conditions is especially restrictive
or demanding.
Methodology
Gruber acknowledges two methodological difficulties. First is the
difficulty in assessing what the reaction of the loser nation
would have been if the enactor state did not take action. Second is
the difficulty of determining if a member government is better or worse
off because of its participation in a particular institution. Upon
accounting for these difficulties, Gruber applies his hypotheses to
NAFTA and the EMS. The author stress that despite not proving the empirical
validity of his theoretical claims beyond any doubt, the evidence presented
in these case studies lends plausibility to his arguments. In
his conclusion, which illustrates that the application of his theoretical
framework is in no way confined only to North America and Western Europe
or only to cases of economic cooperation, Gruber utilizes examples
as diverse as the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1997, the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, and the ratification
of the U.S. Constitution by the thirteen newly independent American
states.
Research
Summaries are designed to help broaden the dissemination of current
policy-relevant research. These Summaries are funded by the Irving
B. Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies at the University
of Chicago.
For more information, contact Jamie Rosmans at HarrisSchool@uchicago.edu or
(773) 702.2287.
