Press Release

Panel Says Bioterrorism Hard to Defend, But Hard to Perpetrate

Those attempting to defend the nation from bioterrorism can do little to analyze the intent or capability of groups who wish to perpetrate it, said a panelist at a May 9 roundtable at the Gleacher Center, co-sponsored by the Harris School's Center for Policy Practice and moderated by Keith Moffat, the University's deputy provost for research.

"We have never been able to analyze intent. It would be very difficult to find out if a group is capable," said Ray Zilinskas, director of the chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation program at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. "What can we do then? All we can do is vulnerability studies."

Assessing the nation's vulnerability to bioterrorism-which can range from contamination of the food or water supply, to the spreading of anthrax or smallpox-starts with breaking down the types of targets that might be hit, Zilinskas said. The food and water supply are probably the most vulnerable, he said, while bacterial or viral infections spread through enclosed areas like stadiums or theme parks are somewhat more difficult to carry out.

Most legislation passed on the subject has dealt with penalties for those proved to have perpetrated bioterrorism, Zilinskas said. Prevention would be the best medicine, but the nation is "a long way from developing detectors in real time," he said.

Project BioShield, a multi-agency federal project established two years ago, is working to improve the intelligence community's ability to develop early warning systems and to collect and disseminate information to prevent bioterrorist attacks, said Jason Boehm, policy analyst with the federal Office of Science and Technology Policy.

Developing comprehensive response plans to treat those affected and hold down casualties if attacks do succeed is another focus of the project, which spans the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Centers for Disease Control, National Institutes of Health, and Food and Drug Administration, Boehm said.

But drug development is a risky, time-intensive venture that the government does not involve itself in, so Project BioShield is attempting to partner with private pharmaceutical companies to undertake research that potentially could also help such companies bring other types of drugs to market, added Boehm.

The federal government has awarded nine contracts totaling $1.2 billion to combat both anthrax attacks and radiological events, parceled out from the $5.6 billion authorized by Congress between now and 2013 for bioterrorism research and development, said Joanna Prasher, policy analyst with the Office of Public Health Emergency Preparedness.

"There's a lot of threats out there, and a lot of projects" underway, she said, adding that a Project BioShield Stakeholders Meeting scheduled for this fall will discuss further measures that should be taken in the nation's defense. "Biodefense is an important priority for this administration," she said.

In response to an audience member's question, Boehm said that federal-state-local coordination in response to an attack is "something we're very focused on. How will we deliver counter-measures to the affected area?"

"No one can be sanguine about preparedness," Zilinskas said. "There's only one real test, and that's when the thing actually happens."

Ed Finkel