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Charles L. Glaser, Ph.D.

Charles L. Glaser is the Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy at the Harris School, as well as Deputy Dean of the School.

Charles L. Glaser, the Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and deputy dean of the Harris School, focuses on international relations, especially issues of international security and defense policy. His current policy-oriented research examines U.S. nuclear strategy and forces. Glaser is studying recent changes in U.S. strategy that call for employing nuclear weapons in preemptive strikes against rogue-state nuclear forces, as well as against other weapons of mass destruction. He has also published articles that are critical of current U.S. national missile defense policies. Glaser's theory-oriented research continues to focus on the impact of the international system on states' behavior. His most recent publication addresses the question of whether arms races are dangerous. Glaser explains that the key is to distinguish between rational and sub-optimal arms races, develops a theory of when a state's best option is to build up its arms, and examines a number of the past century's key arms races. He has published articles on structural realism, the security dilemma, and the offense-defense balance, maintaining that, contrary to the standard realist argument, adversaries can sometimes best achieve their security goals through cooperative policies. Much of Glaser's earlier work focused on American Cold War nuclear weapons policy. Glaser's work examined key questions of U.S. nuclear weapons policy, including strategy, force posture, and arms control. This work culminated in his book, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy, which was followed by articles that assessed how U.S. nuclear policy should be modified at the end of the Cold War. Responding to enthusiasm for nuclear disarmament, Glaser questioned whether the United States should pursue nuclear disarmament as a long-term goal. Glaser also studied European security, focusing on how to transform security arrangements in Europe in response to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union.

Glaser, deputy dean since 1998, has served as acting dean of the Harris School and a fellow at the Center for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University. After earning his Ph.D. at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, Glaser was a post-doctoral fellow at the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, and a research associate at the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Before joining the University of Chicago, Glaser taught political science at the University of Michigan and served on the Joint Staff in the Pentagon.

Selected Published Papers

  • "Counterforce Revisited: Assessing the Nuclear Posture Review's New Missions," Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 84-126.
  • "When Are Arms Races Dangerous?: Rational versus Suboptimal Arming," International Security, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Spring 2004), pp. 44-84.
  • "Structural Realism in a More Complex World," Review of International Studies (April 2003), pp. 403-414. © Cambridge University Press.
  • "Correspondence: The Case for Limited National and Allied Missile Defense," Steve Fetter and Charles L. Glaser, International Security, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Spring 2002), pp. 196-201.
  • "National Missile Defense and the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy," Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, International Security, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Summer 2001), pp. 40-92.
  • "The Causes and Consequences of Arms Races," Annual Review of Political Science (2000)
    [Reprinted, with permission, from the Annual Review of Political Science, Volume 3 (c)2000 by Annual Reviews.]
  • "Correspondence: Taking Offense at Offense-Defense Theory," Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3, (Winter 1998/99), pp. 200-206.
    [Reprinted in Michael E. Brown, et al., eds., Offense, Defense and War (MIT Press, 2004).]
  • "What is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?," Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 44-82.
    [Reprinted in Michael E. Brown, et al., eds., Offense, Defense and War (MIT Press, 2004).]
  • "The Security Dilemma Revisited," World Politics, Fiftieth Anniversary Special Issue, Vol. 50, No. 1 (October 1997), pp.171-201.
    [Reproduced by permission of the Johns Hopkins University Press.]
  • "Correspondence: 'Current Gains and Future Outcomes'," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 186-193.
  • "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90.
    [Reprinted in Michael E. Brown, Sean Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (MIT Press, 1995); in slightly revised form, Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996) and Benjamin Frankel, ed., Realism: Restatements and Reconstructions (Frank Cass, 1996); and in Michael E. Brown et al.,eds., Theories of War and Peace (MIT Press, 1998).]
  • "Why NATO is Still Best: Future Security Arrangements for Europe," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Summer 1993), pp. 5-50. [Reprinted in Paul F. Diehl, ed., The Politics of Global Governance: International Organizations in an Interdependent World (Lynne Riener, 1997).]
  • "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 1992).
    [Reproduced by permission of the Johns Hopkins University Press.]
  • "Nuclear Policy Without an Adversary: U.S. Planning for the Post-Soviet Era," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Spring 1992).
  • "Do We Want the Missile Defenses We Can Build?," International Security, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Summer 1985), pp. 25-57.
    [Reprinted in Steven E. Miller and Stephen Van Evera, The Star Wars Controversy (Princeton University Press, 1986).]
  • "Why Even Good Defenses May Be Bad," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Fall 1984), pp. 92-123.
    [Reprinted in Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, eds., The Use of Force, Third Edition (University Press of America, 1988); and in Steven E. Miller and Stephen Van Evera, The Star Wars Controversy (Princeton University Press, 1986).]
  • "ICBM Vulnerability: The Cures Are Worse Than the Disease," Albert Carnesale and Charles Glaser, International Security, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer 1982), pp. 70-85.

Courses

  • PP33400 U.S. National Security Policy
        Course Description    |     Spring 2007 Course Syllabus

Contact Information
1155 E. 60th Street, Chicago, IL 60637
Suite 102
E-mail: c-glaser@uchicago.edu
Phone: 773-702-5330
 
  • Books by Charles Glaser
  • Curriculum Vitae
 

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