

Who Helps DeShawn Register to Vote? A Field Experiment on State Legislators*

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Abstract

We contribute to the understanding of political inequality in the U.S. by investigating whether race affects how responsive state legislators are to requests for help with registering to vote. To answer this question we conducted a field experiment in October 2008 involving 4,859 U.S. state legislators who were e-mailed and asked for help with registering to vote. For each email we randomized whether a putatively black alias or a putatively white alias was used as well as what the email signaled the sender's partisan preference. We find that Democratic legislators ostensibly do not engage in differential treatment while Republican legislators are more responsive to requests made by the white alias. The majority of this differential treatment persists when partisanship is signaled. However, further analysis shows that white legislators of both parties exhibit similar levels of differential treatment against the black alias. Both black and non-black minority legislators do the opposite.

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1. Introduction

Political equality is considered to be one of the defining characteristics of a democracy (Dahl 1956; Verba 2003). In the past, American democracy has repeatedly failed to live up to the standard of political equality, especially with regards to its treatment of racial minorities. During much of the nation's history blacks and other minorities were barred from voting (Almaguer 1994; Kim 1999; Klinkner and Smith 1999), and even after the extension of suffrage to these minorities, whites in many states and localities used devices such as Jim Crow laws to suppress political participation among blacks and other minorities (Holt 1979; Kousser 1999; Parker 1990). Yet, despite progress made in the latter half of the 20th century through such developments as the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, many researchers have reached the conclusion that racial minorities continue to be politically disadvantaged and underrepresented relative to their white counterparts (Fraga 1992; Guinier 1994; Hajnal 2009).

In contrast, other researchers have suggested that racial discrimination against blacks in the political sphere may no longer be a concern in the United States (for review see Hajnal 2009, p. 39), with some going as far as to argue that blacks and other minorities are in fact overprivileged in the political sphere (Thernstrom 1987; Chavez 1992; Butler 1995). More broadly, many Americans have come to share the view that social equality for blacks has arrived or is due to arrive soon. Reflecting on the consequences of Barack Obama's election, the *New York Times* reported on its front page in May of 2009, for example, that "Voices Reflect A Rising Sense of Racial Optimism" (Saulny 2009).

In recent years, political and judicial decision-makers have also been asked to appraise America's progress towards racial equality, with many reaching the conclusion that such equality either has essentially arrived or is quite close at hand. For example, writing in the *Washington Post* in June 2009, Congresswoman Lynn Westmoreland (R-GA) described efforts to show that

racial discrimination persists “A joke.” In 2003, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote for the US Supreme Court in *Grutter v. Bollinger* that given the trend of racial progress “the Court expects that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary” in university admissions. Most significantly, however, only seven years after *Grutter*, many observers have concluded that the role of the Court in appraising the extent to which racial discrimination persists is set to grow again. Despite upholding core provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in the case *Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder* by 8-1 in 2009, the Roberts Court’s decision has also largely been interpreted as a harbinger of coming Court judgment on the question of whether or not racial inequality persists in the American political system. In the decision, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that “We are now a very different nation” and that “things have changed in the South,” going on to characterize whether or not “conditions” today have sufficiently improved to warrant striking down the Voting Rights Act as “a difficult constitutional question.” As the *New York Times* reported, such language “suggest[s] that the court [is] steeling itself to make a major pronouncement about the role of race in American democracy.”

Thus, even as institutional actors begin to assess the progress of racial equality in American democracy, there remains significant uncertainty among scholars and political actors alike about whether the political system remains biased against minorities, and even more uncertainty about the source of any such bias. Yet as Verba argues, “of the various ways in which U.S. citizens can be unequal, political inequality is one of the most significant and troubling” (2003: 663). To help understand whether and why racial political inequality is still an important reality in American democracy, we conducted a field experiment in October 2008 involving 4,859 U.S. state legislators. Each legislator was sent an e-mail and asked for help with registering to vote; in the experiment, we randomized whether the e-mail was sent using a

putatively black alias or a putatively white alias. We also randomized whether the e-mail signaled the sender's partisan preference (Democrat or Republican), or signaled nothing about the sender's partisan preference. Note that since our analysis asks for help with registering to vote, it focuses on two core principles of democracy – (1) responsiveness, which is key to representation (e.g. Pitkin 1967), and (2) voter registration, which is the bedrock of democracy and historically significant to the United States – and thus any evidence of racial disparities we observe would thus be a cause for real concern. In this regard our results are not very encouraging.

The initial results of our experiment show that, overall, Democrats are equally responsive to the black and white aliases but that Republicans are more responsive to requests made by the white alias. While the rate of differential treatment we observe among Republicans decreases slightly when partisanship is signaled, suggesting that part of the differential treatment may reflect strategic considerations, the majority of the effect remains. We also find that white legislators of both parties discriminate against the black alias at similar, statistically significant rates while black legislators and legislators of other minority groups do the opposite, responding more frequently to the black alias. This suggests as many have argued that the race of elected officials significantly affects how well minorities are represented. With the majority of blacks represented by whites in their state legislatures¹, our results imply that a significant number of blacks likely still face significant barriers to being fully represented by the American political system.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses our theoretical expectations based on the previous literature. Section 3 then reviews our experimental design, including a description of the sample and the experimental treatments we used. Section 4 reports the results

¹ In our dataset about 60 percent of blacks were represented by a white state legislator.

and section 5 concludes with a discussion of the implications of our results for both politics and political science theory.

2. Should Race Affect Legislators' Responsiveness?

In this paper, we test whether legislators exhibit different treatment in a request for help registering to vote depending on the race of the individual making the request. Given the traditional assumptions about legislators and how they behave, we would not expect to observe them exhibiting differential treatment in how they provide such a constituency service. Legislators are assumed to be driven by reelection; their primary goal is to keep their seat and they take all the steps possible to achieve that end (e.g. Mayhew 1974). Because constituency service does not force legislators to alienate voters by taking unpopular positions, it is considered to be one of the most important tools that they use to achieve their reelection goal (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; King 1991). Helping constituents not only wins over the voters that are being helped, but more importantly helps the legislators develop a reputation for getting things done for their constituents both among the social networks of those that they help and their constituency at large. Given the potentially large impact that constituency service can have on legislators' electoral fortunes, we would expect them to treat each request with care and not exhibit any differential treatment.

Similarly, there are good reasons to expect that the characteristics of the legislators should not have an impact on whether they exhibit differential treatment in favor of one race or another. Legislators are usually assumed to be empty vessels that adapt to the characteristics of their constituency in order to maximize their vote share, which in this case means being responsive to all requests. In sum, the traditional view of legislators leads to the expectation that

race should not have an impact on the how legislators respond to requests for constituency service.

On the other hand, previous research also suggests that racial discrimination remains present throughout American politics and society. Field experiments examining whether racial discrimination exists in securing a job in the work place have found the existence of significant racial biases (e.g., Bertrand and Mullianathan 2004; Pager and Quillian 2005). Furthermore, evidence also suggests that racial stereotypes are still widespread (Bobo 2001; see also Sears, Sidanius, and Bobo 2000) and a potent force in American politics (e.g., Carmines and Stimson 1989; Bobo, Kluegel, and Smith 1997; Kinder and Sanders 1996). These factors along with biases from existing institutions (Hajnal 2009) may all lead to a situation where, overall, blacks are being under-serviced and under-represented.

In addition to any effect from these general biases, there are at least two reasons why we might expect legislators to engage in differential treatment based on the race of the individual making the request. First, in part because of the nature of the request that was made, we might observe legislators engaging in differential treatment because of strategic partisan considerations. As Fenno noted, “Every member has some idea of the people most likely to join his reelection constituency... During a campaign these people will often be ‘targeted’ and subjected to special recruiting or activating efforts” (1978, p. 9). Bartels provides a formalization for this type of argument and concludes that “Rational candidates are impelled by the goal of vote maximization to discriminate among prospective voters, appealing primarily to those who either are likely to vote and susceptible to partisan conversion or reliable supporters susceptible to mobilization (or likely opponents susceptible to demobilization)” (1998, p. 68). Because the request that legislators receive in our experiment is for help with registering to vote, they have exactly the

type of opportunity to mobilize or demobilize voters based on how likely they think the voter is to vote for them.

Since in recent decades blacks have consistently voted for Democratic candidates about 90 percent of the time, while whites have typically split their votes more evenly (ANES 2005), Republican legislators receiving an e-mail from someone with a putatively black name would be likely to infer that he or she is more likely to vote for the Democratic candidate. Republicans therefore might be less responsive to the request for help with registration due to strategic considerations. Likewise, we might expect Democrats to be more responsive to the black alias since a black registered voter is more likely to cast a vote for a Democrat than a white registered voter. Economists refer to strictly rationally based differential treatment as “statistical discrimination,” since it is based on rational expectations given overall statistical trends (e.g. Altonji and Pierret 2001). This stands in contrast to what economists term “taste-based discrimination,” which is based on factors not readily explicable by traditional models of rational choice (e.g. Becker 1957). Rational expectations of how people of different races are likely to vote might lead legislators to discriminate even if they harbor no deeper biases. We thus designed our experiment to help us test whether statistical discrimination based on strategic partisan considerations alone might be responsible for any racial differential treatment we may observe.

Second, we might also expect rates of reply to differ across the putatively racial aliases based on the race of the legislators themselves. Much previous research has suggested that legislators who share descriptive characteristics with their constituents may better represent and advocate for their interests and their policy preferences (e.g., Whitby 1997; Canon 1999; Cobb and Jenkins 2001; Whitby and Krause 2001; Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Griffin and Newman 2007; although see Swain 1993). Indeed, one of the main arguments for increasing the

number of minorities and women who serve as elected officials is based on the expectation that elected officials better represent those who share the same characteristics such as race and gender (Canon 1999; Mansbridge 1999).

3. The Experimental Design

While this is the first time a field experiment has been performed on political elites to test the levels of political inequality, our approach is similar to several experiments that have been conducted in order to measure whether there is discrimination in the job market (Goldin and Rouse 2000; Bertrand and Mullianathan 2004; Pager and Quillian 2005). In this section we describe the specifics of our experimental research design.

3.1. The Aliases – Why Black and White?

We focus on the responsiveness of legislators to blacks as opposed to other racial or ethnic groups for three reasons.² First, there is a long history of unequal treatment of blacks in the United States. Attempts to understand how and why blacks are treated differently than whites stretch back to the beginning of the republic and continue to this day (e.g. de Tocqueville 1835 (2007); Myrdal 1944 (1995); Smith 1997). In addition, inspired by this history, blacks have been central to scholarship on discrimination. Focusing on blacks will thus allow our results to more easily speak to, be situated in, and respond to existing theory.

Second, blacks have a strong and well-known history of preference for one political party, allowing our experiment to most effectively test the claim that any discrimination we observed would be largely based on strategic partisan considerations. An experiment lacking a

² Ideally we would have liked to compare across more racial groups, but because of our small sample we did not think we had enough statistical power to do so. Future research can and should see how the relationship we explore holds across other racial/ethnicity treatments.

group with a well-known and nationally consistent overall partisan preference might not be able to test this claim as effectively.

Finally, as the introduction suggests, many consider whether racial discrimination against blacks persists in the American political system to be an open question. While there are many who argue that it is (e.g., Guinier 1994; Kousser 1999; Hajnal 2009), there are others arguing that it is not (e.g., Swain 1993; Thernstrom and Thernstrom 1997). With the conflicting claims about racial equality coming from the Supreme Court and political elites alike largely situated within the context of white-black relations, this focus also allows our research to most directly speak to ongoing speculation about racial progress in American politics.

3.2. Why Registration to Vote?

Likewise, we chose to focus on the issue of registering to vote rather than simply a routine request for constituency service in part because of the significance of this issue for black-white political relations in the U.S. Since the adoption of racially impartial suffrage nationally in 1870, attempts to disfranchise and disadvantage African-Americans in the political system through secret ballot acts, poll taxes, literacy tests, white primaries, criminal disfranchisement laws, laws designed to facilitate discrimination in registration, and discriminatory electoral structures, have been passed repeatedly and, indeed, often continue to be contested even today.

Just as many have argued social equality for blacks has arrived, as mentioned in the introduction, many others have similarly argued that the goals of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, aimed to prevent the erection of such barriers by prohibiting any state from creating a “voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure ... to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color,” and other political reforms in the realm of political equality have largely been achieved. With the Court

likely to offer its opinion on the state of racial equality in American democracy soon, our results have potentially important implications for this ongoing debate.

Finally, we focus on registering to vote because asking for help with registering to vote just one month prior to the 2008 General election, when the e-mails were sent, also provides the ideal conditions for testing the hypothesis that any observed differential treatment would be due to partisan strategic considerations.

3.3. Why Responsiveness?

Determining whether descriptive representation affects how responsive legislators are to their constituents and not just how they vote is important for three reasons. First, government officials provide individuals an important avenue for access to government services through constituency service. In this experiment, for example, the e-mails asked for help with gaining access to the political process itself. As Young (1990) argues, theoreticians should focus on inequities in the processes by which resources and political power are distributed, not simply the end results of these processes. Second, evidence suggests that when minorities and women view their representatives as more responsive, they participate in politics at higher rates (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Gay 2001; Tate 2003; Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Griffin and Keane 2006). Thus if descriptive representation affects the responsiveness of officials, it may in turn affect the political activity of traditionally underrepresented groups. Finally, from a methodological perspective it is advantageous that the interests of the email sender are clear and straightforward: they want a response. For this reason it is easy to provide a straightforward measure of whether the legislators is acting in the interest of the minority group which is not always true of roll call votes where there are often much more complex policy interests at stake and confounding variables present.

3.4. Treatment Conditions

The full text of the e-mail sent to state legislators is provided in Box 1. We signaled the race of the e-mail sender by randomizing whether the e-mail was signed by and sent from an e-mail address with the name Jake Mueller or the name DeShawn Jackson. We also manipulated the text in order to signal the race and partisan preference of the e-mail sender. Note that each legislator was sent only one e-mail.

We chose the first names Jake and DeShawn because work by Fryer and Levitt (2004) shows that these names are among the most racially distinct. In other words, of the individuals named DeShawn, almost all of them are black while among the individuals named Jake, almost all of them are white. Similarly, we chose to use the surnames Mueller and Jackson because data from the 2000 Census showed that these names were, respectively, among the most distinct white and black surnames in the U.S. that were also fairly common (Word, Coleman, Nunziata, and Kominski n.d.).

(Insert Box 1 About Here)

We also signaled the partisan preference of the e-mail sender by having the text of the letter ask whether there was anything the sender needed to do in order to register in future primary elections, where we randomized whether they asked about Democratic primary elections, Republican primary elections, or did not specify a party (see Box 1). Crossing the race treatment with the partisanship treatment gives a total of 6 treatments.³ We designed these treatment manipulations to first measure whether legislators differentially treated blacks and then

³ When we designed the experiment we included a seventh treatment group which came from the white alias, did not signal partisanship, and included the line “I heard from my pastor at our weekly bible study class that the voter registration deadline is soon.” Our purpose in including this treatment was to try to signal that the writer was evangelical and likely to vote Republican. However the problem is that this treatment differs in that the individual is not only signaling religiosity but also that they are part of a social network, both of which could independently affect the likelihood that they got responses. Our results for this treatment are not reported and do not achieve statistical significance for either party against the baseline.

to test whether there was evidence that any of this differential treatment could be explained by the idea that legislators were simply inferring the partisan preference of the sender from their race. By holding constant the partisan preference of the letter's sender, we can see if the differential treatment we observed was due to strategic partisan considerations and if any residual differential treatment remains that is not attributable to these considerations.

To verify that the larger patterns of partisan support among whites and blacks in the United States were also reflected in the individuals with the names used for the aliases in our study, we examined the distribution of party registration among the individuals with these names in an available voter file (Kentucky's). Shown in Table 1, the data indicate that the last name Jackson and the first name DeShawn are indeed both strong signals of a Democratic partisan preference. The ratio of people registered as Democrats compared to the number registered as Republicans is 2:1 among people with the last name Jackson and 8:1 among people with the first name DeShawn. In contrast, people with the first name Jake or Jacob and the last name Mueller are split evenly across the two parties. Again, this is strong evidence that legislators are likely to infer that DeShawn Jackson has a Democratic preference, but not have strong prior beliefs about the preferences of someone named Jake Mueller.

(Table 1 about here)

3.5. The Sample

Our sample includes all of the valid e-mail addresses for state legislators in the US that were available online through state legislative websites in September 2008. Initially we were able to collect the e-mail addresses of the legislators in all but four of the states: Idaho, New Jersey, Oregon, and Texas. In these four states, state legislators can only be contacted by using a webform similar to the one that is used for contacting members of the U.S. Congress. Of the

remaining 46 states, we subsequently had to exclude observations from Missouri and Indiana. We excluded Missouri because there was an error in the data input process that ultimately led us to send each legislator in Missouri two separate e-mails. Thus, some Missouri legislators received e-mails from both Jake Mueller and DeShawn Jackson. We excluded Indiana from the analysis because rather than sending responses separately, many legislators simply forwarded the e-mail to a shared legislative assistant who then answered both aliases at the same time on their collective behalf. Since we could not identify which legislators forwarded the message, we cannot correctly code the outcome variable for the Indiana legislator.

It is important to remember that we are treating state legislators' e-mail addresses and not necessarily the state legislators themselves. The response (or lack thereof) to any of the e-mails that we sent may have come from someone other than the legislator, such as a staff member. However, we did use the official e-mail addresses that the legislators themselves give on their state's legislative website for use in contacting them; so, even if the legislators themselves did not respond to all of our e-mails, the persons who did respond did so in an official capacity on the behalf of the legislators. Additionally, there is no evidence for a heterogeneous treatment effect in more highly professionalized legislatures, indicating that this concern is unlikely to threaten the external validity of our results.

3.6. Experimental Execution and Responsiveness Measurement

Once we collected the data, we assigned legislators to treatment groups using block randomization by state, legislative chamber, political party, and whether the legislator was up for reelection or not. This method balances the number of legislators sharing these characteristics across treatment groups, although each observation was still equally likely to be assigned to each

of the treatment groups.⁴ We then sent out the e-mails on the first weekend of October because several of the states' voting registration deadlines were the following week. We wanted to send the e-mails before these deadlines passed but also during the time when the legislators were busy with the campaign season so that they could use that extra level of activity as an excuse for ignoring the e-mail if they chose.⁵ In addition, by sending out e-mails just weeks before the 2008 General election, we ensured that the strategic considerations we tested for were at their highest salience for legislators.⁶

After sending the e-mails, about 5 percent of them immediately bounced back as undeliverable because the e-mail addresses were no longer valid. For the analysis we limit the sample to the e-mails that were successfully sent out and use as our dependent variable whether the state legislator responded at all by November 4th, election day in 2008. The advantage of this measure is that it is objective: did the legislator reply or not? One potential criticism of this approach is that it might not detect the full extent of differential treatment, since legislators practicing differential treatment might still reply but not provide any information that would be helpful with registering to vote. Consequently, we also collected data on whether the text of the responses sent by state legislators were helpful, the length of the responses' text in words, and

⁴ To test the robustness of our randomization scheme, we tested for any differences among the other observables on which we did not block: the legislative district's total population, the racial composition of the district, the race of the legislator, and the Squire (2007) index of state legislative professionalism. The results of our randomization check indicate that our randomization scheme was highly successful, $\chi^2(52) = 30.03$, $p = .9966$.

⁵ We believe this was successful since even among legislators who ultimately did reply, several noted the business of the campaign season as a reason for the lateness of their response. The following example comes from a legislator in Alaska in response to the Jake alias: "I apologize that your message arrived in the midst of my e-mail account being bombarded with messages from around the world about Sarah Palin. In our efforts to clear these messages, I fear we overlooked your message..."

⁶ Because we sent all of the e-mails at the same time, the time between when legislators received the e-mail and the voter registration deadline differed across states. Since the partisan composition of legislatures also varies across states, one potential concern is that any differences we observed between the parties might simply be the result of differences in how long each group had to respond before the voter registration deadline came, perhaps altering the political environment or considerations of the legislators heterogeneously across parties. To see if this was a concern we graphed, by party, the cumulative density by how many days before the voter registration deadline the legislators were sent the e-mail request. These results are available upon request and show that there are almost no differences between the parties. Republicans had an average of 13 days to respond to the e-mails before the voter registration deadlines in their states while Democrats had 13.4 days. These results increase our confidence in the results since 0.4 days is not enough to be driving any of the differences we observe between the two parties.

the date of the responses, and found that, while we reach the same general conclusions when using that alternative dependent variables, there is no evidence that the legislators used these tactics to conceal additional differential treatment.⁷

4. Results

4.1 Partisanship and Strategic Considerations

Recall that as part of the experiment we randomized what partisan preference was signaled in each email in order to see whether strategic partisan considerations might be explaining any observed differential treatment by race. In particular, we randomized whether the email asked about registering for Democratic primary elections, Republican primary elections, or did not specify a party (see Box 1 for the exact wording). Since this partisan signal was part of the second paragraph it is possible that those reading the email may have missed this signal. For this reason, we first begin by testing whether there is evidence that they legislators noticed and acted on the partisan preference signaled in the email.

Table 2 reports the full experimental results broken down by political party and establishes that state legislators of both parties are more responsive to their fellow partisans. Republicans were 4.3 percentage points ($p=0.10$) more responsive to emails with a Republican

⁷ We decided to code these variables as a precaution because some of the responses, as the examples below illustrate, indicated that the legislators might have been practicing differential treatment even though they did respond. However, we did not uncover any systematic evidence that legislators intentionally sent unhelpful replies.

- 1) "County Election Board would be a great start."
- 2) "U need to go to courthouse and register then u will be able to vote. Good luck."
- 3) "Mr. Jackson:

You may register legally at your county clerk's office in the county of your residence. Or, if you wish to be registered at some residence for which you are not legally qualified, wish to register after the deadline, or become a voter in any other unlawful way, you can contact Mr. Obama's group, ACORN, and they will register you regardless of your qualifications.

Cordially,
[redacted]"

signal than to those with a Democratic signal, while Democrats were 5.1 percentage points ($p=0.03$) more likely to respond to e-mails with the Democratic signal compared with e-mails containing the Republican signal. Thus legislators of both parties noticed the partisan signal and exhibited differential treatment in favor of fellow partisans because of strategic partisan considerations.

(Table 2 About Here)

Table 2 also shows that while legislators from both parties were more likely to respond to the Jake alias than the DeShawn alias when partisanship was not signaled, the magnitude of this difference varies across the parties. Democratic legislators were only 2.6 percentage points more likely to respond to the Jake alias than the DeShawn alias, a difference that falls well short of statistical significance ($p=0.42$). Republican legislators, on the other hand, were 8.1 ($p=0.02$) percentage points more likely to respond to the request from the Jake alias than from the DeShawn alias. Put differently, the experimental counterfactual implies that about 1 in 12 constituents named DeShawn would not receive a reply to a request for help with registering to vote from their Republican state legislator that they would have otherwise received had they been named Jake.

This pattern is consistent with the possibility that state legislators may be using the race of the individual to infer something about their partisanship. In particular, since blacks have consistently voted for Democratic candidates about 90 percent of the time (see also Table 1 in Section 3), while whites have typically split their votes, Republican legislators receiving an e-mail from someone named DeShawn would be likely to infer that he is someone who is likely to vote for Democratic candidates.

Is there evidence that strategic partisan considerations are driving the differential treatment we observed? If so, we would expect the rates of response to each racial alias to be

indistinguishable when they shared the same partisan signal since Republican and Democratic primary voters are overwhelmingly likely to support their party's candidate in the general election. However, section (a) of Table 2 also shows that Republicans continue to reply less to the black alias by 4.8 percentage points ($p=0.06$) even when the sender has indicated their partisan preference. Though the difference in differences indicates that about 3.3 percentage points, or about 40 percent of the original effect, may be due to this strategic partisan consideration, this difference in the differences between the coefficients is not statistically significant. While there is thus some evidence that strategic considerations may partially motivate the patterns of discrimination that we observed, the effect of the sender's race that we uncovered in the previous subsection remains significant for Republicans even when the partisan signals should have rendered strategic partisan considerations largely moot.⁸

It is possible that our design may have missed some of the effect of strategic discrimination. In addition to partisanship, an individual's race might be a cue for several different characteristics such as their potential behavior in party primaries, preferences across certain issues that are not explained completely by partisanship, their proclivity to vote, or their social class. We cannot isolate all of the things that legislators might be inferring from the race of the individual or the aliases that we employed. However, we believe that while such concerns may have played a small role in the persistence of discrimination, one would still expect the

⁸ One potentially troubling pattern is that, compared to when no affiliation is signaled, Republican legislators respond less frequently overall when the Jake and DeShawn aliases are paired with the Republican affiliation signal compared to when there is no signal about partisanship. We might expect that learning that someone is a fellow partisan should actually increase the overall response rates. However, recall that the emails signaled partisanship by asking the legislator for information on voting in partisan primaries. While the letter that does not signal partisanship also asks about primaries, it does not specify a specific party's primary. Asking directly for instructions on how to vote in the Republican primary in particular may imply a threat to vote against the legislator in the next primary that lowers response rates. However, as long as this effect is not heterogeneous across the treatment names, such that the DeShawn alias' mention of Republican affiliation implies more or less of this threat than the Jake alias', this should not affect the validity of our results. Besides the fact that there is no theoretical reason to expect the effect of the implied threat to be heterogeneous across names, the fact that we observe almost exactly the same degree of differential treatment when there is no reason for a Republican legislator to feel an implied primary threat (i.e. when Democratic affiliation is signaled) suggests that a heterogeneous treatment effect is not at work.

effect of inferred partisanship itself to dwarf these concerns, especially less than one month away from the 2008 General election.

Finally, we also conducted a series of robustness tests for the results in Table 2 including controlling for different combinations of characteristics of the legislators, their district, and their state. At the individual level we included dummy variables controlling for the legislator's race/ethnicity and whether or not they were up for reelection in November 2008, at the district level we controlled for the district's population in 100,000s, and at the state level the Squire Index of state legislative professionalism (Squire 2007) and whether the state is in the American political South. These results are presented in Table 4 in Appendix A. The findings were robust to all of the alternative empirical models.

4.2. Descriptive Representation and the Composition of the Parties

In the previous subsection, we found that while Democrats, like Republicans, responded less to members of the other party compared with members of their own, they did not appear to engage in any differential treatment on the basis of race. Here we explore the possibility that the level of differential treatment we find is lower for the Democrats in part because of the racial composition of the legislators in their party.

Previous research has suggested that legislators who share characteristics with their constituents may be more likely to better represent and advocate for their interests and their policy preferences (Whitby 1997; Canon 1999; Cobb and Jenkins 2001; Whitby and Krause 2001; Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004). While this literature is typically concerned with whether the legislators vote in line with their constituents' preferences, it might also expect legislators to be more responsive to constituents who share their race. If this were true, we would expect white Democrats and Republicans to exhibit differential treatment in favor of the white alias, and

black and possibly other minority Democrats and Republican to exhibit differential treatment in favor of the DeShawn alias. Since minorities constitute 20.4 percent of the Democratic legislators in our sample, but only 2.5 percent of their Republican counterparts,⁹ part of the reason that we observe Democrats exhibiting less of a differential treatment than Republicans may be that the behavior of the large number of minority Democrats conceals or “balances” the behavior of white Democrats in a way that is not possible for Republicans because of the small number of minority, Republican legislators.

(Table 3 About Here)

Table 3 reports the reply rates broken down by the race and party¹⁰ of the legislator when no partisan preference is signaled. Section (a) of Table 3 gives the results for Democrats and shows that the effect of the black alias has significant heterogeneity based on the race of the legislator. White Democrats were 6.8 percentage points more likely to respond to the Jake alias than they are to the DeShawn alias ($p=0.07$), while black Democrats were 12.8 percentage points more likely to respond to the DeShawn alias, though the latter result is not statistically significant ($p=0.15$). However, holding constant the differences between black and white legislators’ overall rates of reply and considering the interaction term that captures the difference in the difference in reply rates between white and black Democratic legislators reveals an effect that is significant at conventional levels. With these differences held constant, white Democrats

⁹ We identified which legislators were black and members of other minority groups (Latino, Arab-American, Native American, and Asian-American) by using, respectively, the directories created by the National Conference of Black State Legislators, the National Association of Latino Elected Officials, the Arab American Institute, the National Caucus of Native American State Legislators and the UCLA Asian American Studies Center.

¹⁰ The minority Republicans are not displayed because there were not enough observations from which to draw conclusions. Those interested in viewing the full results of the experiment including the results for the minority Republicans and the treatment groups that included partisan affiliation broken down by both race and party are directed to Table 6 in the Appendix B.

were 19.7 percentage points less likely to respond to the DeShawn alias than their black counterparts ($p=0.04$).¹¹

Similarly, Democratic legislators of any minority group (including blacks) were also more likely to respond to the DeShawn alias than the Jake alias by 16.5 percentage points ($p=0.02$). Holding constant the overall differences in responsiveness between white legislators and those of any minority group, this represents a 23.4 percentage point difference in rates of differential treatment between minority Democrats and their white counterparts ($p<0.01$). Interestingly, this pattern holds even for only non-black minority Democrats, who responded to the DeShawn alias more frequently by 23.8 percentage points ($p=0.04$), 28.8 percentage points more than their white counterparts ($p=0.02$).

One potential point of criticism is that since districts with more minorities are more likely to elect minorities (a pattern that indeed holds in our data), the amount of minorities in a district might be the actual explanatory cause and the race of the legislator merely associated with this variable (see Grose 2005). However, using census data on the racial composition of state legislative districts, we find no evidence for a heterogeneous treatment effect. In fact, the coefficient is in the opposite direction – the more minorities in a district, the more differential treatment white Democrats practiced, though this finding was not statistically significant.

¹¹ Two other patterns evident from Table 3 are that Republican legislators were more likely to respond than Democratic legislators overall regardless of treatment group and that black Democrats responded far less overall to every treatment group than any other group of legislators. From the perspective of a strict social welfare analysis, one might argue that this means blacks are actually better off when represented by Republicans and whites. Our results are thus subject to multiple interpretations. However, note that there are many factors that may lead legislators to be more or less responsive such as the frequency with which their own constituents use e-mail, the socioeconomic composition of the district, and the occupation of the representative themselves (many legislators responded from their personal e-mail addresses). As we did not experimentally manipulate legislators' race or party, we cannot observe the counterfactual of how, for example, white legislators would have responded if elected in the types of districts in which black legislators are elected. However, we can say with confidence that many white legislators would not have responded to the Jake alias' request had it instead been sent from the DeShawn alias while the opposite is true of minority legislators.

Recall that when we estimated the level of differential treatment for Democrats as a whole (see Table 2), we found that they were only 2.6 percentage points more likely to respond to the Jake alias than they were to the DeShawn alias. As Table 3 shows, this misses significant heterogeneity that exists within the Democratic Party. Among white Democrats the level of differential treatment in favor of the white alias is nearly triple the original size that we estimated. Notably, this amount of differential treatment is comparable to the amount of differential treatment we observe among white Republicans, shown in section (b) of Table 3. Part of the reason that we observe Democrats exhibiting less of a differential treatment towards the Jake alias on average than their Republican counterparts has to do with the racial composition of Democratic party officials. The black and minority legislators in the Democratic Party exhibit a differential treatment in favor of DeShawn that helps to balance the differential treatment of Jake exhibited by white Democratic legislators. When comparing white Republicans and white Democrats, the differences in their levels of differential treatment is far smaller, less than one percentage point.

Finally, as with Table 2, we conducted a series of robustness tests for the results in Table 3 including controlling for whether the legislator was up for reelection in November 2008, the district's population in 100,000s, the Squire Index of state legislative professionalism (Squire 2007), and whether the state is in the American political South. These results are presented in Table 5 of Appendix A. The findings here were robust to all of the alternative empirical models.

5. Discussion

In October 2008 we conducted a field experiment to test whether legislators' responsiveness to a request for help with registering to vote depended on the race of the e-mail sender. We found that Republican legislators responded about 8 percentage points more

frequently to requests sent by a white alias compared to requests made by a black alias.

Democrats were also more responsive to the white alias, though only by 2.6 percentage points.

Subsequent analysis showed that strategic partisan considerations and the racial compositions of districts alone could not fully explain the reason that legislators engage in differential treatment. While our experiment was successful in eliciting partisan bias from members of both parties, we continued to observe differential treatment by race when holding these partisan considerations constant, indicating that while purely strategic concerns may matter they do not explain all of the observed differential treatment. However, we did find that the amount of differential treatment that Republicans practice decreased by about 40 percent when partisanship is signaled, indicating that they may infer that someone with the name DeShawn is highly unlikely to vote Republican and act in a strategic partisan manner to try to keep these voters from the polls. While this finding was not statistically significant, it should motivate future research since it offers some evidence that legislators are using the characteristics of voters to make inferences about their partisan preferences. Prior research has shown that voters use characteristics of candidates and incumbents, such as gender, to make inferences about their ideology (e.g., Koch, 2000, 2002; Dolan 2004), but, at least to our knowledge, this is the first research to test whether elected officials engage in similar behavior such as that theorized by Bartels (1998, p. 68).

We then found that the black and minority legislators in the Democratic Party exhibited significant differential treatment in favor of the black alias that balanced the differential treatment of the white alias exhibited by white Democratic legislators. The difference between rates of differential treatment practiced by white Republicans and white Democrats was negligible, with both groups responding less frequently to the putatively black alias by about 7 percentage points.

One of the arguments often advanced for increasing the number of women and minority legislators through mechanisms such as minority-majority state legislative districts is that elected officials do a better job representing people with whom they share racial and gender characteristics (Canon 1999; Mansbridge 1999). Similarly, previous research has suggested that black constituents participate in politics at higher rates when black legislators represent them because they believe black legislators are more responsive to their concerns (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Gay 2001; Tate 2003). While there is ongoing debate about the effectiveness and unintended consequences of some mechanisms designed to increase the number of minority elected officials (e.g. Cameron, Epstein, and O'Halloran 1996; Epstein and O'Halloran 1999; Gay 2007), our results provide direct support for the broader argument that how effectively minorities are represented does depend on the race of their representatives.

It is possible that the legislators inferred something other than partisanship from the aliases we employed. For example, Fryer and Levitt (2004) argue that the artifacts of social class implied by distinctively racial names in particular might have driven the results of some other similar studies such as Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) that have sought to uncover racial bias through the use of such names. It is beyond the scope of this paper to speculate further on the mechanisms for racial discrimination; we cannot rule out the possibility that the true causal effect we uncovered is due to inferred economic disparities. However, even with such alternative explanations in mind we still believe these findings are important since differential treatment is problematic for democracy no matter why it is practiced, especially when access to the ballot box is at stake.

As we found that non-black minorities were also significantly more likely to respond to the DeShawn alias, our findings also prompt further exploration of whether the benefits of descriptive representation – traditionally defined as one minority group being represented by a

member of that same group – might also operate when one minority is represented by another minority of a different background.

On a related note, claims made in the debate over Voter ID laws (see Brennan Center 2008; Barnes 2008) that legislators may be willing to take action to suppress partisan turnout receive some support from our results; however, our results also indicate that legislators of both parties might be inclined to limit minority turnout for reasons unexplained by these groups' partisan preferences alone. While these results do not prove what motives were behind the passage of Voter ID laws, for example, they do raise concern that regardless of their party the very legislators responsible for crafting the ways that citizens interact with American political institutions display a willingness to discriminate against minorities when they seek access to these institutions.

Similarly, our results cast significant doubt on claims that patterns of racial inequality do not persist in the American political system. With the Court expecting measures designed at addressing social inequality will be unnecessary within less than two decades, Members of Congress calling evidence of continuing discrimination “a joke”, and some on the Court ready by all accounts to declare discrimination a fact of the past in the American political system, our experiment reveals the opposite – we found that legislators of every racial group exhibited detectable levels of differential treatment.

Race still matters in American politics – both for elected officials and their constituents. While the election of Barack Obama as the United States' first African-American president is an auspicious development for race relations in America, our politics are still not color blind.

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Box 1. E-mail Sent to State Legislators

From: *[Treatment Name]*
To: **[Legislator's E-mail Address]**
Subject: A Question on Registering to Vote

Dear **[Representative/Senator]** **[Legislator's Last Name]**,

My name is *[Treatment Name]* and I'm trying to figure out how to register to vote for the upcoming election. I heard that the voter registration deadline is soon.

Who should I call in order to register? Also, is there anything special I need to do when I register so that I can vote in future *[blank/Democratic/Republican]* primary elections?

Thanks,
[Treatment Name]

Note: Bolded items were manipulated across e-mails. Items in italics were assigned randomly based on the treatment group.

Table 1. Party Registration of Actual Individuals with the Experimentally Manipulated Names

	First Name DeShawn	Last Name Jackson	First Name Jake/Jacob	Last Name Mueller
Republican	9.7%	30.9%	44.2%	43.5%
Democrat	80.6%	63.0%	46.7%	45.7%
Other/Independent	9.7%	6.1%	9.1%	10.8%
N	72	8,249	2,282	538

Notes: Data comes from the 2008 Kentucky voter file and shows the party registration of actual individuals with the names of the aliases used in the study. The data indicate that the last name Jackson and the first name DeShawn are both strong signals of a Democratic partisan preference.

Table 2. Rates of E-mail Response by Party, Treatment Name, and Partisanship Signal

(a) Republican Legislators					
	No partisanship	Republican	Democrat	Party Differential	
Jake	67.0%	63.1%	58.5%	4.0	Combined 4.3 [^] (<i>p</i> =0.10)
Mueller	N=364	N=366	N=357	(<i>p</i> =0.28)	
DeShawn	58.9%	58.0%	54.0%	4.5	
Jackson	N=360	N=362	N=361	(<i>p</i> =0.21)	
Race	8.1*	5.1	4.5		
Differential	(<i>p</i> =0.02)	(<i>p</i> =0.16)	(<i>p</i> =0.22)	4.8 [^] (<i>p</i> =0.06) Combined Effect	
(b) Democratic Legislators					
	No partisanship	Republican	Democrat	Party Differential	
Jake	55.1%	51.1%	52.7%	-1.6	Combined -5.1* (<i>p</i> =0.03)
Mueller	N=448	N=454	N=442	(<i>p</i> =0.63)	
DeShawn	52.4%	51.3%	59.9%	-8.5**	
Jackson	N=446	N=448	N=451	(<i>p</i> =0.01)	
Race	2.7	-0.2	-7.1*		
Differential	(<i>p</i> =.424)	(<i>p</i> =0.94)	(<i>p</i> =0.03)	-3.7 (<i>p</i> =0.11) Combined Effect	

Notes: The first column supplies the response rates when partisanship was not signaled while the second and third columns, respectively, supply the response rates when the Republican and Democratic partisan signals were included in the e-mails. The next to last row in each section of Table 2 then gives the difference in the response rates between the Jake and DeShawn aliases for that particular partisan signal. These values are calculated so that positive values indicate a differential treatment in favor of Jake and negative values a differential treatment in favor of DeShawn. The last row gives the combined race differential when pooling the observations for which partisanship was signaled. The second to last column in each section gives the difference between the response rates between the Republican and Democratic partisan signals for that particular alias, while the last column pools the party differential for both the Jake and DeShawn aliases. Positive values in these columns indicate differential treatment in favor of the Republican signal while negative values indicate differential treatment in favor of the Democratic signal. P-values (two-tailed) are reported below the coefficients. [^]Sig. at the 0.10 level (two-tailed), *Sig. at the 0.05 level (two-tailed), **Sig. at the 0.01 level.

Table 3. Rate of E-mail Response, By Experimental Condition, Party, and Race of Legislator

State Legislator Group	Treatment Name		Percentage Point Difference
	Jake Mueller	DeShawn Jackson	
(a) Democratic Legislators			
White Legislators	61.2% N=363	54.3% N=348	6.8 [^] (<i>p</i> =0.07)
Black Legislators	29.1% N=56	41.9% N=62	-12.8 (<i>p</i> =0.15)
Other Minorities (Excluding Blacks)	31.4% N=35	55.3% N=38	-23.8* (<i>p</i> =0.04)
Any Minority (Including Blacks)	29.4% N=85	45.9% N=98	-16.5* (<i>p</i> =0.02)
(b) Republican Legislators			
White Legislators	66.9% N=356	59.3% N=351	7.6* (<i>p</i> =0.04)

Notes: [^]Sig. at the 0.10 level (two-tailed), *Sig. at the 0.05 level (two-tailed), **Sig. at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).

Appendix A. Robustness of Findings in Tables 2 and 3

We also conducted a series of robustness tests for the results in Tables 2 and 3 including controlling for different combinations of characteristics of the legislators, their district, and their state. At the individual level we included dummy variables controlling for the legislator's race/ethnicity and whether or not they were up for reelection in November 2008, at the district level we controlled for the district's population in 100,000s, and at the state level the Squire Index of state legislative professionalism (Squire 2007), whether the state is in the American political South. These results are displayed in Tables 4R and 5R below. For the regressions in Table 4 the excluded or baseline group is emails from Jake without a partisan signal. In Table 5, the excluded or baseline group is emails from DeShawn without a partisan signal. In each case the first column gives the results of the regression when not controlling for any other factors (i.e. the results corresponding to what is shown in Tables 2 and 3).

Table 4. Robustness of Results in Table 2

Independent Variable	Republicans				Democrats			
	Coefficient (Std. Error)	Coefficient (Std. Error)	Coefficient (Std. Error)	Coefficient (Std. Error)	Coefficient (Std. Error)	Coefficient (Std. Error)	Coefficient (Std. Error)	Coefficient (Std. Error)
DeShawn, Non-partisan	-0.081* (0.036)	-0.083* (0.036)	-0.083* (0.036)	-0.084* (0.036)	-0.027 (0.033)	-0.021 (0.033)	-0.027 (0.032)	-0.023 (0.032)
Jake, Republican	-0.039 (0.036)	-0.036 (0.036)	-0.041 (0.036)	-0.038 (0.036)	-0.040 (0.033)	-0.036 (0.033)	-0.040 (0.032)	-0.037 (0.032)
Jake, Democrat	-0.085* (0.036)	-0.082* (0.036)	-0.085* (0.036)	-0.082* (0.036)	-0.024 (0.033)	-0.022 (0.033)	-0.023 (0.033)	-0.020 (0.032)
DeShawn, Republican	-0.090* (0.036)	-0.087* (0.036)	-0.089* (0.036)	-0.087* (0.036)	-0.038 (0.033)	-0.037 (0.033)	-0.036 (0.032)	-0.037 (0.032)
DeShawn, Democrat	-0.130** (0.036)	-0.127** (0.036)	-0.129** (0.036)	-0.127** (0.036)	0.047 (0.033)	0.043 (0.033)	0.048 (0.032)	0.044 (0.032)
Legislator and District Characteristics Included?	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
State Characteristics Included?	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
N	2170	2170	2170	2170	2689	2689	2689	2689

Notes: Individual level control variables include dummy variables controlling for the legislator's race/ethnicity and whether or not they were up for reelection in November 2008. District level controls include the district's population in 100,000s. State level controls include the Squire Index of state legislative professionalism (Squire 2007) and a dummy for whether the state is in the American political South. The omitted or baseline group is those receiving emails from Jake when no partisan preference signal is given. *Sig. at the 0.05 level (two-tailed), **Sig. at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).

Table 5. Robustness of Results in Table 3

<i>Democratic Legislators</i>								
Independent Variable	Whites				Blacks			
	Coefficient (Std. Error)	Coefficient (Std. Error)	Coefficient (Std. Error)	Coefficient (Std. Error)	Coefficient (Std. Error)	Coefficient (Std. Error)	Coefficient (Std. Error)	Coefficient (Std. Error)
Jake, Non-partisan	0.68 [^] (0.037)	0.071 [^] (0.037)	0.069 [^] (0.036)	0.070* (0.036)	-0.128 (0.089)	-0.138 (0.089)	-0.11 (0.087)	-0.107 (0.088)
Legislator and District Characteristics Included?	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
State Characteristics Included?	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
N	711	711	711	711	117	117	117	117
<i>Minorities (excluding Blacks)</i>								
Independent Variable	Minorities (excluding Blacks)				Minorities (including Blacks)			
	Coefficient (Std. Error)	Coefficient (Std. Error)	Coefficient (Std. Error)	Coefficient (Std. Error)	Coefficient (Std. Error)	Coefficient (Std. Error)	Coefficient (Std. Error)	Coefficient (Std. Error)
Jake, Non-partisan	-0.238* (0.114)	-0.219 [^] (0.118)	-0.239* (0.117)	-0.205 [^] (0.120)	-0.165* (0.071)	-0.167* (0.072)	-0.162* (0.071)	-0.144* (0.072)
Legislator and District Characteristics Included?	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
State Characteristics Included?	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
N	73	73	73	73	183	183	183	183
<i>Republican Legislators</i>								
Independent Variable	White Legislators							
	Coefficient (Std. Error)	Coefficient (Std. Error)	Coefficient (Std. Error)	Coefficient (Std. Error)				
Jake, Non-partisan	0.076* (0.036)	0.075* (0.036)	0.077* (0.036)	0.076* (0.035)				
Legislator and District Characteristics Included?	N	Y	N	Y				
State Characteristics Included?	N	N	Y	Y				
N	707	707	707	707				

Notes: Individual level control variables include dummy variables controlling for the legislator's race/ethnicity and whether or not they were up for reelection in November 2008. District level controls include the district's population in 100,000s. State level controls include the Squire Index of state legislative professionalism (Squire 2007) and a dummy for whether the state is in the American political South. The omitted or baseline group is those receiving emails from Jake when no partisan preference signal is given. [^]Sig. at the 0.10 level (two-tailed), *Sig. at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).

Appendix B. Full Experimental Results, By Race and Party of Legislator

Table 6. Full Experimental Results, By Race and Party of Legislator

(a) White Republicans					
	No partisanship	Republican	Democrat	Party Differential	
Jake	66.9%	62.5%	59.5%	-3.0	Combined -3.7 (<i>p</i> =0.16)
Mueller	N=356	N=352	N=348	(<i>p</i> =0.41)	
DeShawn	59.3%	57.9%	53.5%	-4.4	
Jackson	N=351	N=354	N=353	(<i>p</i> =0.24)	
Race	7.6*	4.6	5.9		
Differential	(<i>p</i> =0.04)	(<i>p</i> =0.21)	(<i>p</i> =0.11)	5.3* (<i>p</i> =0.04) Combined Effect	
(b) Black and Non-Black Minority Republicans					
	No partisanship	Republican	Democrat	Party Differential	
Jake	75.0%	78.6%	22.2%	-56.4***	Combined -25.7 (<i>p</i> =0.11)
Mueller	N=8	N=14	N=9	(<i>p</i> <0.01)	
DeShawn	44.4%	62.5%	75.0%	12.5	
Jackson	N=9	N=8	N=8	(<i>p</i> =0.62)	
Race	30.6	16.1	-52.8*		
Differential	(<i>p</i> =0.22)	(<i>p</i> =0.46)	(<i>p</i> =0.03)	-12.2 (<i>p</i> =0.45) Combined Effect	
(c) White Democrats					
	No partisanship	Republican	Democrat	Party Differential	
Jake	61.2%	58.3%	56.3%	-2.1	Combined 2.1 (<i>p</i> =0.42)
Mueller	N=363	N=355	N=352	(<i>p</i> =0.58)	
DeShawn	54.3%	56.1%	62.1%	6.1^	
Jackson	N=348	N=362	N=375	(<i>p</i> =0.10)	
Race	6.8^	2.2	-5.9		
Differential	(<i>p</i> =0.06)	(<i>p</i> =0.55)	(<i>p</i> =0.11)	-1.9 (<i>p</i> =0.47) Combined Effect	
(d) Black Democrats					
	No partisanship	Republican	Democrat	Party Differential	
Jake	29.1%	18.8%	24.1%	5.3	Combined 13.2* (<i>p</i> =0.03)
Mueller	N=55	N=64	N=54	(<i>p</i> =0.49)	
DeShawn	41.9%	22.4%	44.0%	21.6*	
Jackson	N=62	N=58	N=50	(<i>p</i> =0.02)	
Race	-12.8	-3.7	-19.9*		
Differential	(<i>p</i> =0.15)	(<i>p</i> =0.62)	(<i>p</i> =0.03)	-11.2^ (<i>p</i> =0.06) Combined Effect	
(e) Non-Black Minority Democrats					
	No partisanship	Republican	Democrat	Party Differential	
Jake	30.0%	37.1%	61.1%	24.0*	Combined 16.8^ (<i>p</i> =0.06)
Mueller	N=30	N=35	N=36	(<i>p</i> =0.04)	
DeShawn	52.8%	50.0%	57.7%	7.7	
Jackson	N=36	N=28	N=26	(<i>p</i> =0.58)	
Race	-22.8^	-12.9	3.4		
Differential	(<i>p</i> =0.06)	(<i>p</i> =0.32)	(<i>p</i> =0.79)	-4.4 (<i>p</i> =0.63) Combined Effect	

Notes: ^Sig. at the 0.10 level, *Sig. at the 0.05 level, **Sig. at the 0.01 level. A positive difference in the race differential rows indicates a lower response rate towards the DeShawn alias compared to the Jake alias, while a negative difference indicates a higher response rate towards the DeShawn alias compared to the Jake alias.