

## **Campaign Appeals and Legislative Action**

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### **ABSTRACT**

I explore the extent to which the campaign appeals made by congressional candidates serve as credible signals about the issues they will pursue in office. My analyses focus on the televised advertisements of 391 House candidates in the 1998, 2000, and 2002 elections and the content of their subsequent legislative activity in the 106th-108th Congresses. I track candidates' and legislators' attention to a set of 18 different issues and show that legislators do indeed follow through on the appeals they make in campaigns. However, the strength of the linkages between campaign appeals and legislative activity varies in a systematic fashion with features of candidates' rhetoric. These findings illustrate the value of extending the study of campaign effects to include phenomena that occur after Election Day and of conceiving of the linkages between electoral and legislative politics as a locus for representation.

Modern electoral campaigns are the target of numerous critiques, but among the most common is the lament that candidates' appeals are merely "cheap talk," designed to sway voters and maximize vote shares on Election Day, but with little connection to what they actually plan to do once in office. In public opinion polls, large majorities of respondents endorse this view, agreeing that "to win elections, most members of Congress make campaign promises they have no intention of fulfilling" and that it is rare for candidates to "try to keep their promises."<sup>1</sup> Although scholars have tended to be more sanguine about the prospect that elections can successfully fulfill their role as a linking mechanism between the public and its representatives, some of the most hotly contested debates in the field in recent years have focused on campaigns and their effects.

Assessments of campaigns typically invoke one of two basic standards—the extent to which candidates' discourse approximates normative ideals about elections as a locus of deliberation and debate, and the degree to which exposure to campaigns has positive vs. negative effects on voters. Research on the first standard has asked whether candidates devote more time to discussion of substantive issues or character traits (Kahn and Kenney 1999; Sides 2006); whether they offer specifics about their issue priorities or limit themselves to vague valence claims (Geer 2006; Stokes 1992; Sides 2006); whether competing candidates engage in a back-

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<sup>1</sup> In the 2004 National Annenberg Election Study, only 1/3 of respondents said they thought candidates try to keep their promises "always" or "most of the time," and in a 1999 survey by The Project on Campaign Conduct, nearly 3/4 of respondents reported that they were "very" concerned about candidates saying one thing and doing another once elected (Spiliotes and Vavreck 2002). The belief that candidates are insincere is not a new development—in a 1988 ABC/*Washington Post* poll, 71% agreed that "most members of Congress make campaign promises that they have no intention of fulfilling," (Ringquist and Dasse 2004) down from 81% who agreed with a similar statement in a 1971 Harris Survey.

and-forth dialogue on issues or “talk past one another” (Kaplan, Park and Ridout 2006; Sigelman and Buell 2004; Simon 2002); and whether critiques of opponents are fair and factually accurate or unfounded and misleading (Geer 2006). Analyses of campaign effects on voters have explored the influence of media coverage and candidate advertising on citizens’ knowledge about politics, evaluations of candidates, turnout decisions, and attitudes toward government (for a summary, see Brady and Johnston 2006). Most notably, research has focused on the impact of negative ads, investigating whether negativity leads voters to be informed and interested or cynical and disengaged (see, for example, Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995; Brooks 2006; Brooks and Geer 2007; Goldstein and Freedman 2002; Lau and Pomper 2004; Wattenberg and Briens 1999).

Perhaps surprisingly, there has been almost no attention to a third, equally important standard—the level of correspondence between winning candidates’ appeals in campaigns and their activity in office. In other words, do campaign appeals serve as credible signals about future legislative behavior? Are candidates who raise a given issue in their campaigns more active on it in the next Congress than those who do not? Relatedly, does the *type* of appeal matter? Do candidates who advocate specific solutions to policy problems pursue those issues more intently than those who talk about them in a general fashion? Are claims candidates make about their own interests in an issue better or worse predictors of their later activity than claims that criticize the opponent on it?

The answers to these questions are important for a number of reasons. Most directly, they help to put critiques about campaign discourse in context. Laments about the vague and general nature of campaign appeals are rooted in the assumption that such appeals are uninformative and insincere, and a common argument in the debates about negativity in campaigns is that time candidates spend attacking their opponents is time taken away from serious attention to policy

problems (but see Geer 2006). However, these intuitions have never been tested, so we do not know whether negative appeals provide less information about legislators' priorities than positive appeals or whether vague claims are indeed less sincere than those that are specific. A rigorous investigation of these questions may provide empirical support for the conventional wisdom, but it may also call into question some of the critiques often leveled at candidates.

Levels of follow-through from campaigning to governing also have important bearing on the nature and quality of representational linkages. Indeed, the degree to which elected officials keep their promises is central to normative conceptions of democratic accountability. Due to a variety of conceptual and methodological constraints, however, promise-keeping has been largely peripheral to empirical research on legislative representation and responsiveness. By placing campaigns at the center of the study of representation, we gain a broader view of their importance in the representative process, as well as a more nuanced conception of how legislators negotiate the dual demands of campaigning and lawmaking.

In this paper, I assess the linkages between campaign appeals and legislative activity for a sample of 391 winning House candidates in the 1998-2002 elections.<sup>2</sup> My source of data about campaign appeals is candidates' televised advertisements and my source of data about their subsequent legislative activity is the issue content of their bill and resolution introductions and cosponsorships. I develop a theory for why campaigns should serve as accurate signals about legislative activity, explore the relationships between the issues candidates discuss in their

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<sup>2</sup> Of course, finding that linkages exist between campaign appeals and subsequent activity means that citizens could use ads to make inferences about legislators' policy priorities, but does not indicate that they actually do so. A direct examination of citizens' interpretations of candidates' appeals is beyond the scope of this paper, but would provide a useful extension of the results.

campaigns and those they prioritize in office, investigate whether the signaling power of appeals varies with the type of rhetoric used, and establish why these differences exist

### **Campaign Appeals and Legislative Action**

Given the normative and theoretical importance of the linkages between electoral politics and governing, why have scholars of campaigns and Congress devoted so little attention to them? Within the legislative studies literature, it can be attributed in large part to the traditional division of labor between work on congressional elections and work on legislative behavior and organization, such that any single study typically addresses one area or the other, but not both. Thus, although the idea of the "electoral connection" (Mayhew 1974) is central to theorizing about Congress, it is usually conceived of prospectively, as how legislators speculate about the effects of their policy decisions on their future electoral prospects, rather than retrospectively, as how features of past campaigns manifest themselves in later behavior (but see Sulkin 2005).

The development of a literature on promise-keeping and related phenomena has been further hampered by the disjuncture between most normative and formal theories of the elections-policy linkage and the realities of congressional politics. Textbook models of representative democracy presume that during campaigns, parties make promises about what policies they will pursue if voted into office; on Election Day, voters select candidates from the party whose policy positions and priorities most closely approximate their own; in office, winners do or do not implement their promises; and, in the next election, voters decide whether or not to re-elect them (see, for example, Harrington 1993; Schattschneider 1942; Schedler 1998). This perspective may provide a fairly accurate depiction of parliamentary systems where parties are the central focus<sup>3</sup> but it captures less adequately the dynamics of most U.S.

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<sup>3</sup> For example, see Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge (1994) for an analysis of the links between party

congressional elections. In a candidate-centered system without strong parties, individual representatives and senators cannot meaningfully promise to bring about a particular outcome, nor can they be blamed if their preferred policies fail to become law. As such, most analyses of the relationship between elections and policy in the U.S. have focused not on individual legislators, but on presidential promise-keeping (Fishel 1985; Jamieson 2000; Krukones 1984) or more macro-level phenomena like congressional responses to perceived mandates (Grossback, Peterson, and Stimson 2006), parties' abilities to implement their platforms (Budge and Hofferbert 1990; Pomper 1968), and the role of electoral realignments in producing policy change (Brady 1988; Sinclair 1977).

Finally, the small literature that does exist on congressional promise-keeping has been limited by its sole focus on legislators' positions as the target of responsiveness. These studies define promise-keeping as the level of congruence between the positions legislators take on an issue in office (i.e., as expressed through their roll call votes) and their stated positions on that issue from the campaign (see, for example, Ringquist and Dasse 2004). This conceptualization is undoubtedly meaningful and useful, but it can be studied in only a narrow set of situations because candidates rarely stake out the kind of positions that would enable one to connect a campaign appeal to a later roll call. Instead, they more often make claims along the lines that they are “champions for education” or are “tough on crime” (Sides 2006; Stokes 1992). Because there can be considerable disagreement about what types of policies would best support these goals, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to assess legislators' follow-through on their vague appeals by examining their roll call voting decisions. As such, to fully understand the linkages between the electoral and legislative arenas, it is necessary to shift the focus from candidates'

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platforms and government performance in parliamentary democracies.

and representatives' issue *positions* to their issue *priorities*, as reflected in the content of the legislation they introduce and cosponsor.<sup>4</sup>

Studying these linkages also requires a change in perspective from the traditional approach to analyzing campaigns. Scholars of electoral politics have understandably focused on the dynamics of campaigns themselves, which means that the search for campaign effects typically ends when campaigns end--on Election Day. Along the same lines, most models of how candidates select campaign issues focus not on their post-election policy goals, but on the more immediate aim of maximizing vote share by highlighting issues on which they hold the advantage vis a vis their opponents.<sup>5</sup> Sometimes this advantage is theorized to stem from a legislator's own record (Sellers 1998; Sides 2006), but more often it is thought to relate to general factors like ideology or party. Thus, spatial models suggest that a candidate should highlight an issue if his or her position on it is closer than the opponent's to the median voter

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<sup>4</sup> One could argue that activities like introductions and cosponsorships are less policy-relevant and more "symbolic" than roll call votes. At the level of individual legislators, though, they are one of the few avenues available for expressing their commitments. In addition, there is evidence that the factors that shape them "are not significantly different from the factors that account for more explicitly outcome-relevant legislative behavior such as roll call voting." (Krehbiel 1995, 922; see also Hall 1996; Koger 2003; Schiller 1995; Sulkin 2005). More generally, as is also the case with most studies of roll call voting, the feature of interest here is legislators' overall patterns of introductions and cosponsorships, not whether a single action is pivotal in determining a policy outcome.

<sup>5</sup> In the classic formulation, Downs (1957) asserts that candidates "never seek office as a means of carrying out particular policies; their only goal is to reap the rewards of holding office *per se*... Upon this reasoning rests the fundamental hypothesis of our model: parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies" (28).

(Downs 1957; Hammond and Humes 1993; Simon 2002) and issue ownership models suggest that candidates should highlight those issues that their party is thought most competent to handle (Ansolabehere and Iyenger 1994; Brasher 2003; Petrocik 1996; Spiliotes and Vavreck 2002). While such strategies are not necessarily inconsistent with linkages between campaign appeals and policy activity, neither do they suggest that campaign and legislative priorities will be strongly interrelated.

### **Expectations about the Linkages between Campaigns and Legislative Priorities**

What expectations should we have about the relationship between appeals and legislative activity? Although the public has been cynical and political scientists largely silent about the potential of congressional campaign appeals to serve as signals about later behavior, I expect that linkages between the campaign and legislative arenas will be common because legislators have clear incentives to make sincere appeals in campaigns and to follow through on them once in office. Many of these incentives are electoral; for example, prior research shows that candidates do better at the polls when they highlight issues for which they have a background (Sellers 1998). And, even if voters rarely monitor their representatives' activity in Congress, critics of the incumbent, particularly potential challengers, are always on the lookout for weaknesses they can exploit (Arnold 1990, 2004; Sulkin 2005). Evidence of forgotten promises makes a particularly compelling narrative for challengers, so savvy incumbents should seek to avoid such behavior. Moreover, even if in reality there was no punishment for failing to follow through on appeals, we know that legislators are particularly risk averse about their reelection prospects and so may behave *as though* it matters.

Second, and equally important, I assume that reelection is not legislators' sole goal; many also have strong policy interests and, when given the opportunity, will pursue them. When

designing their campaign agendas, their own priorities should therefore be an important criterion in selecting among the larger set of issues for which they enjoy some sort of advantage. As Fenno (2007) argues, for those with particular policy interests, a consistent focus on these issues at home in their districts, on the campaign trail, and in Washington, DC contributes to the aura of authenticity for which successful legislators strive. From the perspective of legislators, then, the distinction between campaign behavior and governing behavior may be largely artificial. Finally, it is also possible that some legislators view campaign appeals as implicit promises and so feel that their job as representatives compels them to follow through on them, or, at the least, to limit their appeals to issues they intend to be active on in office.

As such, there are both pre- and post-election factors that encourage strong linkages between appeals and activity. Candidates stand to gain from highlighting issues that they plan to pursue in Congress and, once having raised them in their campaigns, there are advantages to following through. Disentangling these effects would be difficult, but it is not necessary to do so because this endogeneity does not pose a problem, and is, in fact, a fundamental part of the theory. In short, to the extent that campaign appeals are sincere, linked to legislators' preexisting interests and priorities, they should also serve as good signals about future legislative activity. Put another way, the central question to be addressed is whether there is a high level of correspondence between the issues candidates say are important to them in campaigns and the issues they subsequently pursue in office, not whether appeals are somehow exogenous, *causing* this behavior.<sup>6</sup> Indeed, a purely causal relationship would contradict the basic theory because it

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<sup>6</sup> The same holds true for policy congruence-based conceptions of legislative representation, where strong representational linkages are said to exist when legislators' votes align closely with their constituents' preferences. Whether these linkages arise because legislators respond to constituents, constituents respond

would suggest that campaign issues are chosen without regard to legislators' past priorities or the enduring interests of their constituents.

This reasoning leads to two expectations—first, that linkages between appeals and activity will be widespread, and second, that the strength of the connections will vary with the nature of the claims a candidate makes about an issue (e.g., whether or not the issue is featured prominently, whether the discussion is positive vs. negative, and whether it is specific vs. vague). In making predictions about the relationships between rhetoric and follow-through, the crucial point to consider is whether the choices candidates make about *how* to discuss an issue are reflections of the intensity of their interest in it, or whether they are driven by strategic considerations that are unconnected to policy intentions. For instance, most research on campaigns views candidates' appeals about themselves as better indicators of their interests than their criticisms of their opponents because decisions to "go negative" are largely a function of the closeness of the race (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995; Jamieson 1992; Kahn and Kenney 1999; Sigelman and Buell 2003).<sup>7</sup> Relatedly, choices about the content of attacks are usually based on the opposition research that most candidates undertake. If these investigations indicate that attacking the opponent on an issue like crime will help the candidate, then he or she should do so, regardless of whether the issue is a priority. As such, I expect that positive appeals candidates make about their own interests in an issue will serve as stronger predictors of their subsequent activity than negative appeals that criticize their opponents on the issue.

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to legislators, or whether a combination of both occurs is an important, but distinct, question.

<sup>7</sup> An exception is Geer (2006), who argues that, to be credible, issue-based attacks must have empirical support. However, this does not necessarily mean that these critiques will serve as useful signals about the attacker's own priorities.

A similar logic applies to expectations about the strength of the relationship between the prominence of issues and the volume of later activity on them. To the extent that campaign appeals serve as signals, it seems reasonable to assume that featuring an issue in all of one's ads would be a stronger signal than discussing it rarely. However, how much attention any one issue receives is related to the overall size of a candidate's agenda, which, like the propensity to attack, is influenced by the competitiveness of the race (Kahn and Kenney 1999; Sulkin, Moriarty, and Hefner 2007). As a result, while we might expect that candidates who devote a great deal of attention to an issue in their ads will be more attentive to it in office than those who mention it only in passing, I do not predict that there will be consistent linear relationships between the relative prominence of issues in winning candidates' campaign and legislative agendas.

Expectations about the relationship between the specificity of appeals and later activity are a bit less clear a priori. In general, specific appeals are viewed as normatively superior because they provide more information and are assumed to reflect more commitment to an issue. Offering a specific plan for an issue like job growth would seem to suggest that the candidate has thought about the issue and, because such specificity often takes up more advertising space than the claim that one is "for" jobs, means that he or she is devoting more of a scarce resource to it. Specific appeals may also indicate that the candidate cares enough about the issue that he or she is willing to alienate potential supporters who would disagree with the details of the plan, or that he or she has been active on the issue in the past and so will continue that activity in the future (Kahn and Kenney 1999; Sides 2006). On the other hand, there are some situations in which ambiguity may be a better strategy (Page 1978; Shepsle 1972), so candidates may choose to be vague for electoral reasons that have little connection to their level of commitment to an issue. Moreover, savvy candidates should see that vague appeals offer them more leeway in following

through. A candidate who promises to support a particular policy proposal could well find his or her attempts thwarted in the legislative process (e.g., if an unacceptable rider is attached to the bill), but one who promises to be active in solving a problem will be better able to adapt to circumstances outside of his or her control. As a result, and contrary to the conventional wisdom, I do not expect that specific appeals will necessarily serve as stronger signals than vague appeals.

## **Data and Methods**

To test these predictions requires detailed information on the campaign appeals and subsequent legislative activity of a large sample of candidates/legislators across a number of issues. My source of data about candidates' appeals is the televised advertisements produced and run by winning House candidates in the 1998, 2000, and 2002 elections, and my source of data about the legislative activity of these winners is the content of their bill and resolution introductions and cosponsorships in their next terms (the 106th-108th Congresses).

Campaign advertisements are particularly well-suited to my investigation because, compared to sources like news coverage or surveys of candidates, they enable me to assess exactly what a candidate said (or, equally important, did not say) about issues during the course of the campaign. In addition, because ads present candidates with a limited amount of time in which to make their appeals, they force them to make choices, and therefore should provide good indicators of their priorities (see also Sides 2006).<sup>8</sup> Finally, because most voters are more likely to be exposed to a candidate through television advertising than through watching news

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<sup>8</sup> The number of ads produced and aired varies considerably across candidates. Accordingly, in the analyses that follow, the focus is on candidates' relative attention to and treatment of various issues, not the overall volume of their advertising on an issue.

coverage, attending a speech, or accessing a website, ads are the best source for identifying how candidates present themselves and their priorities to their potential constituents.

In the 1998 and 2000 elections, the Campaign Media Analysis Group (CMAG) and the Wisconsin Ads Project collected and archived all advertisements run by candidates in the top 75 media markets in the U.S., expanding their efforts in 2002 to include the top 100. These markets comprise the vast majority (>80%) of congressional districts and so, while races in a handful of the smallest states are excluded, the sample very closely approximates the population of candidates who ran ads during these elections. Of course, not all candidates advertise, so the analyses are limited to the 391 who did so.<sup>9</sup> If my goal were to explore the behavior of a random sample of legislators, including those who did and did not actively campaign, this approach would raise concerns about representativeness. However, because the goal is to assess whether appeals made in advertisements serve as predictors of subsequent activity, the true population of interest is not all legislators, but all legislators who launched a campaign and advertised in the previous election, and the CMAG/Wisconsin Ads Project archives come very close to capturing this. Moreover, the sample displays considerable variation on a number of variables of interest.

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<sup>9</sup> A total of 397 winning candidates ran ads. However, there were five candidates for whom no storyboards were archived and one candidate (Newt Gingrich in 1998) who did not take office for a long enough time after the election to accumulate a legislative record. Of the remaining 391, I have full advertising data for 365 and partial advertising data for 26 (i.e., some of these candidates' storyboards were missing). The candidates for whom I have partial data are included in the analyses when appropriate. For example, if a candidate produced two ads and I have the storyboard for one where he or she discussed agriculture, I can confidently say that the candidate raised that issue. However, I cannot say anything about discussion of other issues because I do not know the content of the missing storyboard. As such, that candidate would be included in analyses of agriculture, but excluded in analyses of other issues.

Forty-two percent of the candidates are Democrats and 77% are incumbents, and representatives from 43 states are included, with seniority in office ranging from 0-26 years and vote shares ranging from 50-100%.

I make use of two features of the CMAG/Wisconsin Ads Project data collection efforts: the actual storyboards for each of the advertisements (which include screenshots of the visuals and the text of the audio) and the figures on how often each ad was aired by each candidate. The 391 winning candidates in the sample ran a total of 1468 unique ads representing 209,221 ad airings.<sup>10</sup> The first step of the coding process was to read each of these 1468 ad storyboards and note all of the substantive issues discussed.<sup>11</sup> The coding scheme is adapted from those of the Policy Agendas Project (see Baumgartner and Jones 2002), the Wisconsin Ads Project (see Goldstein and Freedman 2002), and Sulkin's (2005) analysis of winning legislators' attention to their challengers' themes. It includes 18 categories, which are presented in Table 1. As measures of relative attention to issues, Table 1 also presents data on the number of candidates who raised the issue, the average percentage of "advertising time" (defined in more detail below) devoted to each issue by the group of candidates who raised it, the proportion of introduced legislation on the issue across the Congresses I study, and the mean number of activities (introductions and cosponsorships) undertaken by members of the sample on the issue.

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<sup>10</sup> A number of individuals appear in the sample in more than one election year, which is controlled for in the analyses that follow. The 391 cases include 250 different legislators.

<sup>11</sup> Each storyboard was coded by three coders, working independently. Most differences that existed between them were the result of one coder missing an issue that the others identified, rather than disagreements about the appropriate category for a claim. Findings about the relative prominence of various issues and the frequency of specific vs. vague appeals in the 1998-2002 elections correspond closely to Sides' (2006) results, offering a confirmation of the validity of the coding procedures.

### **Insert Table 1 about here**

After identifying all of the ads that discussed a particular issue, I conducted a second round of coding, this time noting particular features of how the issue was discussed. In this round, then, the unit of analysis is not the ad, but each of the ~3000 issue claims in the ads. The measures include dummy variables for whether or not the candidate referenced him- or herself, whether or not the opponent was mentioned with reference to the issue (either by name or by a term like "my opponent"),<sup>12</sup> and whether the claim about the issue was vague or specific. Vague claims are those that merely state that an issue is important or that the candidate cares about it, and specific claims are those that take a position, offer a plan for dealing with the issue, or discuss a contribution the candidate has made. For example, in the "environment" category in the 2000 elections, vague claims include those like "We want to conserve the environment" (Johnny Isakson, R-GA) and "[Hoeffel wants to]...invest in the environment" (Joseph Hoeffel, D-PA), while specific claims include those like "In Congress I'm working to set aside more land as wilderness and limit development by keeping open space open" (Mark Udall, D-CO) and "I brought two million dollars to the town of Effing to help keep the river clean and brought funding to UNH to study better ways to clean up hazardous waste..." (John Sununu, R-NH). Each issue appeal was coded by four coders, with levels of agreement ranging from 80% to 90%, depending on the issue.

With the ad storyboards coded and the results aggregated to the level of individual legislators, I have indicators of all of the issues in a candidate's agenda and the manner in which each was discussed. The average candidate discusses between 4 and 5 of the 18 issues in the scheme (the range is 0-10), about 40% reference their opponent on at least one of the issues they

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<sup>12</sup> All claims were coded as referring to the candidate unless the only language about the issue was clearly directed solely at the opponent.

raise, and, depending on the issue, between about one-quarter and one-half make specific claims. To measure how prominently each issue was featured, I calculate an "advertising time" figure for each candidate for each issue. These figures take into account both how many times ads that featured a particular issue ran, as well as how many other issues were discussed. They sum to one for each candidate, allowing for comparisons across candidates and issues.<sup>13</sup>

Legislative activities, the second component of the analysis, were coded using the same issue scheme. I began by compiling lists of all of the bills and resolutions introduced and cosponsored by each sampled representative in the term preceding and following the campaign of interest.<sup>14</sup> I obtained lists of bill introductions from Adler and Wilkerson's Congressional Bills Project and lists of resolutions and cosponsorships from the Library of Congress's THOMAS site.<sup>15</sup> In all, the representatives in the sample made a total of 4412 bill and joint resolution introductions and 87,644 cosponsorships. As the first step of the content analysis of these activities, I assigned an issue code to each of the 21,780 bills and joint resolutions introduced in

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<sup>13</sup> For example, imagine that a candidate ran two ads. The first, which discussed taxes, aired 100 times. The second, which discussed Medicare and taxes, aired 200 times. The size of the "agenda space" for this candidate would be 500 issue airings and the advertising time would be 60% for taxes (300 airings) and 40% for Medicare (200 airings).

<sup>14</sup> 304 of the 391 legislators in the sample were also in Congress in the term preceding the campaign of study. Their previous activity (a total of 3357 introductions and 64,501 cosponsorships) is investigated below in the analysis of candidates' rhetorical strategies.

<sup>15</sup> I limit the analysis to joint resolutions because they are the only type that, if passed, have the force of law.

the 105th-108th Congresses.<sup>16</sup> The categories provided by the Congressional Bills Project were the starting point for these codes, but all measures were individually recoded into the new scheme. The code for the "parent" introduction was then assigned to the corresponding cosponsorships made by each of the sampled representatives. Finally, I aggregated up to the level of the individual legislator to determine how many activities each undertook on each issue.

### **Assessing the Linkages between Campaign Appeals and Legislative Activity**

I begin my analysis of the linkages between campaign appeals and legislative activity with the most fundamental question--are candidates who discuss an issue in their campaigns subsequently more active on it in Congress than those who do not? To address this question, I analyze each of the eighteen issues separately, with the dependent variable in each of the models a count of the number of legislative activities (introductions + cosponsorships) made by each of the winning candidates in their next terms.<sup>17</sup> Because the dependent variables are counts, I estimate the models using negative binomial regression and, because some legislators appear in the sample in multiple years, I cluster the standard errors on the legislator. The independent variables include a dummy for whether the issue was mentioned in the previous campaign, a control for the total amount of activity engaged in by the legislator, and controls for election

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<sup>16</sup> In addition to the 18 substantive issue categories, there is an additional category for "government operations" measures--those related to topics like congressional procedures, currency, use of the Capitol for ceremonial purposes, etc. As shown in Table 1, these comprise about 17% of introduced measures.

<sup>17</sup> Combining activities in this fashion gives more weight to cosponsorships, since legislators cosponsor more measures than they sponsor. However, given the low Ns for activity (as shown in Table 1), the difference at the level of individual issues is typically not large. In addition, the pattern of results is largely the same when separate models are run for introductions and cosponsorships. As such, for ease of presentation and discussion, I combine them.

year/Congress (since relative attention to issues varies across time).<sup>18</sup> I intentionally limit my use of controls because my goal is to approximate the signal the typical voter receives from a campaign. In other words, by observing what candidates say in their ads and considering little else about their predispositions, can we predict what issues they will prioritize in office?

The results are summarized in Model 1 of Table 2. The cell entries report the coefficients on the dummy variables for having mentioned the issue.<sup>19</sup> Positive and statistically significant coefficients indicate that campaign appeals serve as signals about the relative content of legislators' agendas. As shown, there is clear evidence of relationships between appeals and activity. Indeed, for 15 of the 18 issues, I find that candidates who raised the issue in their campaigns were subsequently more active on it in the next Congress than those who did not.<sup>20</sup> The only issues for which campaign discussion is not associated with higher activity are campaign finance, defense and foreign policy,<sup>21</sup> and welfare. For all others, including some that

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<sup>18</sup> The one specification that differs is for corporate regulation. It was not raised by any candidates in 1998 or 2000, but reached the agenda in 2002 in response to Enron and other associated scandals. To provide a more rigorous test of the relationship between appeals and activity, I limit analysis to the 2002 election/108th Congress. However, the substantive conclusions are the same if I include all years.

<sup>19</sup> Because each model reflects the results of 18 different specifications, it is not practical to report them all in the table. However, full results are available in the Appendix.

<sup>20</sup> The controls for election year mean that these results cannot be attributed to the fact that an issue might have been salient at one time, so more candidates raised it in that campaign and it was higher on the agenda in the next Congress.

<sup>21</sup> The category for defense and foreign policy in legislative activity includes everything from funding for VA hospitals to U.S. policy toward specific countries. However, nearly all candidates who discussed the issue, even after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, focused on veterans and military personnel.

were very popular and salient (e.g., education, Social Security, Medicare, health) and some that were mentioned only rarely (e.g., children's issues, civil rights, consumer issues), having discussed the issue serves as a significant predictor of subsequent activity.

**Insert Table 2 about here**

Importantly, these results are not just a function of partisan differences in issue priorities. When party is included as a control in the models, 14 of the 15 linkages maintain their significance, and, when I split the sample by party and conduct separate analyses for Democrats and Republicans, I find 8 significant linkages for Democrats and 11 for Republicans. Thus, the content of campaign appeals also often enables us to distinguish the relative policy commitments of copartisans (i.e., Overall, candidates who raise environmental issues are more active on them in Congress than those who do not, but it is also the case that Democrats and Republicans who raise the issue are more active than their fellow party members who do not).

Equally important, the magnitude of the relationships is substantively meaningful. For instance, candidates who devote none of their advertising to the environment, health, and taxes engage in an average of 15.8, 23.7, and 12.5 activities on these issues, while those who raise them engage in 21.9, 29.4, and 16.3 activities, respectively (all differences are significant at  $p < .05$ ). The average legislator engages in about 210 policy activities per term, so these differences reflect considerable variation in their agendas, particularly since the comparison averages across all candidates who mentioned an issue, including those who did so only in passing.

Having established that linkages between campaign appeals and legislative agendas are widespread, the next question is whether the strength of these linkages varies with the nature of

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When I limit the analysis of legislative activity to bills and resolutions focusing on this area, I find significant relationships between discussion of the issue and subsequent activity on it ( $B = .13$ ;  $p < .10$ ).

candidates' issue appeals. In particular, does taking into account the relative amount of attention a candidate devotes to an issue (rather than just whether he or she raised it) add additional predictive power about subsequent activity? Do claims legislators make about themselves have the same relationship to later behavior as claims about their opponents? Does the specificity of the appeal matter? To answer these questions, I use the same basic model as for Model 1, but replace the dummy variable for mentioning the issue with other indicators of discussion of the issue. In the prominence analysis, the independent variables include both a dummy for mentioning the issue and the candidate's advertising time for the issue; in the referent of appeal analysis, I use two dummy variables, one for whether the candidate mentioned the issue in reference to him- or herself and another for whether the issue was mentioned in reference to the opponent; and in the specificity analysis, I use a dummy for mentioning the issue and a dummy for whether or not a specific appeal was made about the issue (1 = specific appeal and 0 = vague appeal or no appeal).

The results for the prominence analysis are summarized in Model 2 of Table 2. As shown, there are significant effects for at least one of the indicators of issue discussion for 11 of the 18 issues. The dummy variable is the sole predictor of activity for 5 of the issues, the advertising time variable is the sole predictor for 4, and, in 2 of the cases, both variables are significant (though, for civil rights, the coefficient on advertising time is negative). These results confirm that the prominence of issues is only rarely related to variation in activity. For some issues, more campaign attention signals greater legislative attention, but for many, just having raised the issue is the important feature.

The findings for the tone and specificity of appeals are more consistent. Model 3 shows that when discussion of an issue is separated by the referent of the appeal, there are significant

relationships for 14 of the 18 issues. However, while mentioning oneself is a significant predictor of activity for 13, mentioning the opponent is significant for only 4, and, for one of these (consumer issues), the relationship is negative. The conclusion here is clear; appeals that attack the opponent on an issue provide less information about candidates' legislative priorities than claims they make about themselves. For instance, when candidates discuss their views on the Patients' Bill of Rights, this serves as a signal that they'll be more active on health than those who do not discuss the issue, but there is no difference in later activity between those who only criticize their opponents' position on the PBR and those who do not raise health at all.<sup>22</sup>

The analysis of specificity yields a similar conclusion. The results in Model 4 demonstrate that there are only two issues for which specificity serves as a predictor of activity above and beyond mentioning the issue.<sup>23</sup> Moreover, the two issues (children's issues and civil rights) are among the least mentioned by candidates. For virtually all issues, then, variation in the specificity of appeals made by candidates has no relationship with their later activity on the issue. Thus, candidates who raise an issue like crime are more active on it than those who do not, but laying out detailed plans for dealing with crime does not serve as a stronger signal than just saying that one wants to "make our neighborhoods safer."

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<sup>22</sup> This is not to say that negative appeals do not convey any information. Critiques of the opponent may provide truthful assessments of his or her record or positions, and may even imply that the candidate will take the opposite position, but they do not indicate that the candidate intends to pursue the issue.

<sup>23</sup> The substantive conclusions about the effects of specificity remain the same when I use whether candidates made a claim about themselves and whether or not those claims were specific as dummy variables. As such, this finding cannot be attributed to the fact that specific appeals may also be more likely to be negative and, as such, less informative about subsequent activity.

## **Mechanisms Underlying the Campaign Appeals-Legislative Activity Linkage**

The findings to this point demonstrate that there are indeed clear linkages between the issues that candidates prioritize in their campaigns and those they pursue in office, indicating that campaigns meet the signaling standard fairly well. Equally important, and perhaps more interestingly, the *way* in which candidates discuss an issue appears to matter, though not always in the manner suggested by the conventional wisdom. The results confirm that concerns about the level of negativity in campaigns may be warranted because candidates' choices to spend their scarce advertising time attacking their opponents weaken the heuristic value of campaigns as a signal about the content of their subsequent activity. On the other hand, candidates are often critiqued for their tendency to make vague appeals, but, while there may indeed be benefits to specificity, it is not the case that vagueness equates with insincerity.

To complete the picture, it is necessary to establish why these differences exist. Why do positive claims serve as stronger signals about later activity than negative claims? Why do vague and specific appeals serve as equally good predictors of legislative priorities? Why isn't issue prominence more consistently related to later activity? As hypothesized above, the answer to these questions should lie in the factors that explain candidates choose to discuss issues in the manner that they do. More precisely, I expect that candidates' decisions to raise an issue in reference to themselves should be strongly related to other indicators of their interest in the issue, but decisions about how prominently to feature the issue, whether to attack the opponent, or whether to offer a specific vs. vague claim should be only weakly related to these.

The analyses summarized in Table 3 are designed to test this hypothesis. In these analyses, the dependent variables are indicators of the nature of candidates' advertising on an issue (i.e., whether or not they mentioned themselves or their opponents and, if they did discuss

the issue, the advertising time devoted to it and whether or not at least one specific appeal was made). The primary independent variables are indicators of candidates'/legislators' level of interest in the issue. These include the proportions of their legislative agendas in the last term that were devoted to each issue<sup>24</sup> and relevant constituency characteristics. For the agriculture and crime models, the constituency characteristic is the percentage of the district that is rural/urban; for the child care and education models, the percentage of school-age kids; for the civil rights model, the percentage of non-white residents; for the defense model, whether or not there is a military base in the district; for the Medicare and Social Security models, the percentage of the district over the age of 65; and for the jobs and infrastructure, corporate regulation, taxes, and welfare models, the median income of the district (in thousands of dollars). As was the case with previous analyses, I also include controls for election year and, since some legislators appear in the sample in multiple election years, I cluster the standard errors on them.<sup>25</sup> The table presents summaries of these results, with full results presented in the Appendix.

As shown, the results largely confirm my expectations. The findings in Model 1 indicate that candidates' volume of past legislative activity on an issue is significantly related to whether

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<sup>24</sup> The inclusion of this variable requires that I limit this investigation to the 304 legislators in the sample who had been in office previously. Another potential indicator of legislators' likely policy priorities could be their previous committee or subcommittee assignments. However, because these would be highly correlated with their volume of activity on an issue, do not always map cleanly on to the issue categories in my scheme, and would not allow me to capture activity outside of committee assignments, I opt to use introductions and cosponsorships instead.

<sup>25</sup> Given the rare occurrence of some of the events of study, it was not always possible to estimate the models with all independent variables included. For these, as noted in the Appendix, I omitted the dummy variables for election year.

or not they make appeals about themselves on it for 11 of the 18 issues. In contrast, Model 2 shows that the same holds true for only 3 of the 18 for mentioning the opponent and, for one of these (agriculture), the relationship is actually negative. Similarly, the results for Model 3 demonstrate that, among the group of candidates who discuss an issue, levels of past activity explain variation in advertising time for only 4 issues, and for one (crime), the relationship is inverse. Model 4 reveals that activity has virtually no relationship with the specificity of claims--the only significant linkage is for taxes, and there, the relationship between the two is negative.

The results for constituency characteristics follow the same pattern. For 12 of the 18 issues, there is a corresponding constituency characteristic, and, for 7 of these, that characteristic is a significant predictor of the candidate raising the issue in reference to him or herself.<sup>26</sup> However, relationships exist for only 3 of the issues for mentioning the opponent, 3 issues for advertising time (and, for defense, the relationship is negative), and 1 issue for specificity (agriculture, for which the relationship is again negative). Overall, then, having an extensive record on an issue or representing a constituency that is particularly affected by it often leads candidates to discuss their views on the issue, but has much less of a relationship with how they do so.

### **Insert Table 3 about here**

These findings beg the question, though, of what *does* explain why some candidates are more likely to attack their opponents on an issue, offer a specific claim, or feature it prominently. Previous work on candidate behavior suggests that more general strategic considerations like the

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<sup>26</sup> For an eighth issue, children's issues, the relationship between the relevant constituency characteristic (the proportion of the district under 18), and mentioning the issue is negative. Given the small number of candidates who raised this issue, though, this finding should be interpreted with caution.

competitiveness of the race and the electoral status of the candidate (i.e., incumbent or not) drive the size of candidates' agendas and their rhetorical choices (Kahn and Kenney 1999; Sides 2006; Sulkin, Moriarty, and Hefner 2007). My final analyses, reported in Table 4, address this possibility. The dependent variables in the models are the total number of issues a candidate raised in reference to him- or herself (Model 1), the number of issues for which the opponent was mentioned (Model 2), and the number of issues for which a specific appeal was offered (Model 3). Independent variables include whether the race was categorized as a "tossup" by the *Cook Political Report*, whether the candidate was an incumbent, party, election year, and, for the analyses for critiques of the opponent and specificity, the total number of issues raised by the candidate. Models are estimated using negative binomial regression, with standard errors clustered on candidates.

#### **Insert Table 4 about here**

The results indicate that candidates in close races do indeed raise more issues (and so tend to devote less advertising time to any one issue than those with smaller agendas) and attack their opponents more often. Electoral status matters in a similar fashion, with incumbents more likely to raise issues in reference to themselves and less likely to attack their opponents. With the controls included, incumbents and tossup candidates were no more or less likely to make specific appeals, but the dichotomous measure is masking some variation on the latter, as specificity is significantly negatively related to eventual vote share (i.e., with candidates in close races more likely to make specific appeals,  $r = .10$ ,  $p < .10$ ). Interestingly, Democrats make more specific appeals than Republicans, perhaps because of their minority status during this time period made them more likely to contrast their views on issues with those of the ruling majority. Overall, then, these results provide support for the argument that, while the content of appeals may be

linked to candidates' individual policy interests, rhetorical features of those appeals are a function of general contextual factors, and, as such, do not provide much additional insight into their likely priorities in office.

## **Conclusions**

The overarching conclusion to be reached from the findings presented here is that campaign appeals often serve as useful and meaningful signals about the issues legislators will pursue in Congress and, as such, are more than just "cheap talk." The common lament that candidates make appeals to win elections and then ignore them in office therefore seems rooted more in voters' cynicism about politics than in reality.

The results also confirm the utility of a new criterion for evaluating campaign discourse based on the signaling power of candidates' appeals. In short, when assessing campaigns, we should think not just about whether the discourse that takes place among candidates approximates normative ideals about discussion and deliberation or whether certain features of campaigns have positive or deleterious effects on voters' attitudes, but also about whether these features serve as credible signals about legislators' policy intentions. Sometimes this signaling-based perspective yields conclusions that mirror those of other perspectives (i.e., as with the findings about negativity), but, at other times, it leads to different conclusions about campaign rhetoric. Most notably, it underscores the importance of positive but vague appeals. Many view valence claims that candidates make about themselves (e.g., that they "want to improve our schools" or "insure quality health care" or "preserve natural resources"), as valuable only because they are not negative, seeing them as relatively uninformative and potentially insincere (Geer 2006). In contrast, my results show that they serve as strong signals about the issues that

legislators will pursue in office, and, indeed, predict this behavior just as well as more specific appeals.

There are, of course, several possible critiques of these conclusions. The first is that while vague appeals may tell us about the content of legislators' agendas, they do not tell us about their positions. Thus, the claim that a candidate "wants to improve our schools" may signal that she will be active on education, but does not reveal his or her stance on "No Child Left Behind." This is undoubtedly true, and is one of the reasons why signaling should not be the sole standard for assessing the quality of discourse or the strength of representational linkages. That said, the view that constituents care solely, or even mostly, about the positions their representatives take on issues is called into question by work on citizens' knowledge about and attitudes toward their elected officials. Instead, it may be just as accurate to say that the public most often cares about solving problems, and is willing to grant substantial leeway to its representatives to pursue these problems as they see fit (Arnold 1990; Bianco 1994). From this standpoint, responsiveness occurs when legislators are active in office in addressing the policy problems they prioritized in their campaigns, and the results here suggest that they meet this standard fairly well.

The second potential critique relates to the argument that campaign appeals serve as good indicators of future behavior because they are linked to legislators' preexisting interests. As a result, campaigns do not necessarily offer voters information that they could not glean from a careful examination of legislators' records. From a representational perspective, though, what is most important is the degree of correspondence between legislators' behavior as candidates in campaigns and their activity as policymakers in Congress. The claim that campaigns matter only to the extent that they serve as an *independent* source of information proposes a different normative standard with a different set of underlying assumptions. It is also worth noting that

this critique applies equally to the other standards invoked in assessing campaigns. Just as the most educated voters may be able to see past negativity or to determine where opposing candidates stand on the issues even if they do not engage in dialogue with one another, they may also be able to predict what candidates will do in office. However, because most voters do not have the interest or knowledge to do so, campaigns serve for them as the primary source of information and, as such, what transpires during them is important.

In sum, exploring the linkages between campaign appeals and legislative activity offers new insight into the nature and extent of campaign effects and the effectiveness of elections at promoting representation. From this point of view, campaigns clearly "matter," even if they seldom have direct persuasive effects on voters and even if the outcome of most races is never in doubt. However, only by bridging the gap that divides studies of electoral and legislative politics to capture campaign effects that extend beyond Election Day can we fully understand and evaluate the role that campaigns play in democratic politics.

**APPENDIX--Full Results for Tables 2 and 3**

<b>TABLE 2, MODEL 1</b>	<b>Mention Issue?</b>	<b>Policy Acts</b>	<b>2000 Election</b>	<b>2002 Election</b>	<b>Constant</b>
<b>Agriculture</b> (N=371)	.44***	.002***	-.31***	-.33***	1.41
Wald Chi-sq=84.9, p=.00	(.10)	(.000)	(.08)	(.08)	(.11)
<b>Budget</b> (N=376)	.22**	.001	-.24**	-.15	.92
Wald Chi-sq=14.5, p=.01	(.10)	(.000)	(.09)	(.12)	(.15)
<b>Campaign Finance</b> (N=370)	.16	.002***	-.12	-1.25***	.54
Wald Chi-sq=127.4, p=.00	(.12)	(.000)	(.08)	(.12)	.11
<b>Children's Issues</b> (N=368)	.50***	.005***	-.50***	-.25***	-.06
Wald Chi-sq=176.6, p=.00	(.15)	(.001)	(.07)	(.08)	(.13)
<b>Civil Rights</b> (N=368)	.70***	.006***	-.28***	.03	.27
Wald Chi-sq=111.6, p=.00	(.25)	(.001)	(.07)	(.09)	(.19)
<b>Consumer Issues</b> (N=368)	.29**	.004***	-.32***	-.40***	.97
Wald Chi-sq=125.5, p=.00	(.12)	(.000)	(.06)	(.08)	(.12)
<b>Corp. Regulations</b> (N=121)	.26**	.002***	---	---	.59
Wald Chi-sq=36.4, p=.00	(.11)	(.001)			(.13)
<b>Crime</b> (N=373)	.13***	.004***	.14***	.31***	1.55
Wald Chi-sq=111.9, p=.00	(.04)	(.000)	(.05)	(.05)	(.11)
<b>Defense</b> (N=368)	.03	.005***	.12***	.18***	2.41
Wald Chi-sq=163.2, p=.00	(.05)	(.000)	(.03)	(.04)	(.10)
<b>Education</b> (N=384)	.17***	.005***	.03	-.02	1.21
Wald Chi-sq=163.6, p=.00	(.06)	(.000)	(.05)	(.06)	(.11)
<b>Environment</b> (N=374)	.39***	.005***	-.32***	-.49***	1.72
Wald Chi-sq=147.2, p=.00	(.08)	(.001)	(.06)	(.06)	(.12)
<b>Health</b> (N=374)	.19***	.006***	-.07*	-.08	1.87
Wald Chi-sq=254.9, p=.00	(.04)	(.000)	(.04)	(.05)	(.10)
<b>Jobs and Infrastructure</b> (N=382)	.05*	.003***	-.21***	-.31***	2.83
Wald Chi-sq=254.9, p=.00	(.03)	(.000)	(.03)	(.03)	(.06)
<b>Medicare</b> (N=380)	.12**	.005***	-.05	-.22***	1.46
Wald Chi-sq=124.9, p=.00	(.06)	(.000)	(.05)	(.06)	(.13)
<b>Moral Issues</b> (N=371)	.24*	-.001*	.37***	.71***	1.64
Wald Chi-sq=65.6, p=.00	(.14)	(.000)	(.08)	(.09)	(.12)
<b>Social Security</b> (N=381)	.09*	.003***	.02	-.29***	.76
Wald Chi-sq=127.2, p=.00	(.05)	(.000)	(.05)	(.06)	(.09)
<b>Taxes</b> (N=381)	.32***	.001***	.14**	.06	2.20
Wald Chi-sq=32.1, p=.00	(.06)	(.000)	(.06)	(.06)	(.11)
<b>Welfare</b> (N=370)	.01	.004***	-.15***	-.14**	.88
Wald Chi-sq=118.1, p=.00	(.07)	(.000)	(.05)	(.06)	(.10)

*Note: The table reports negative binomial regression coefficients (with robust standard errors in parentheses) for Model 1 of Table 2. The dependent variable for each model is a count of legislators' introductions and cosponsorships on a particular issue. Ns vary due to partial advertising data for some sampled legislators. The corporate regulations model is limited to 2002. \*\*\* = p < .01; \*\* = p < .05; \* = p < .10*

<b>TABLE 2, MODEL 2</b>	<b>Mention Issue?</b>	<b>Advertising Time</b>	<b>Policy Acts</b>	<b>2000 Election</b>	<b>2002 Election</b>	<b>Constant</b>
<b>Agriculture</b> (N=367) Wald Chi-sq=87.0, p=.00	.37** (.16)	.005 (.009)	.003*** (.000)	-.31*** (.08)	-.34*** (.08)	1.41 (.11)
<b>Budget</b> (N=367) Wald Chi-sq=15.7, p=.01	.15 (.13)	.006 (.005)	.000 (.000)	-.24** (.10)	-.12 (.12)	.91 (.15)
<b>Campaign Finance</b> (N=367) Wald Chi-sq=124.2, p=.00	.07 (.19)	.006 (.012)	.002*** (.000)	-.11 (.08)	-1.23** (.13)	.54 (.11)
<b>Children's Issues</b> (N=367) Wald Chi-sq=164.0, p=.00	.47** (.19)	.002 (.013)	.005*** (.000)	-.48*** (.07)	-.25*** (.08)	-.09 (.15)
<b>Civil Rights</b> (N=367) Wald Chi-sq=113.2, p=.00	.82*** (.27)	-.006* (.003)	.006*** (.001)	-.26*** (.07)	.05 (.09)	.26 (.19)
<b>Consumer Issues</b> (N=367) Wald Chi-sq=130.7, p=.00	.11 (.14)	.007* (.004)	.004*** (.000)	-.32*** (.06)	-.41*** (.08)	.97 (.12)
<b>Corp. Regulations</b> (N=118) Wald Chi-sq=42.0, p=.00	.09 (.17)	.012 (.008)	.002*** (.001)	--- ---	---	.61 (.13)
<b>Crime</b> (N=367) Wald Chi-sq=135.3, p=.00	.20*** (.07)	-.004 (.003)	.004*** (.000)	.14*** (.05)	.31*** (.05)	1.55 (.10)
<b>Defense</b> (N=367) Wald Chi-sq=249.7, p=.00	.10* (.06)	-.003 (.002)	.005*** (.000)	.11*** (.03)	.18*** (.04)	2.42 (.10)
<b>Education</b> (N=367) Wald Chi-sq=164.3, p=.00	.08 (.07)	.004** (.002)	.005*** (.000)	.01 (.05)	-.02 (.06)	1.23 (.11)
<b>Environment</b> (N=367) Wald Chi-sq=151.9, p=.00	.25** (.10)	.007 (.004)	.004*** (.001)	-.17*** (.05)	-.41*** (.06)	1.90 (.12)
<b>Health</b> (N=367) Wald Chi-sq=270.1, p=.00	.10* (.05)	.004** (.002)	.005*** (.000)	-.06 (.04)	-.07* (.05)	1.88 (.10)
<b>Jobs and Infrastructure</b> (N=367) Wald Chi-sq=246.7, p=.00	.03 (.04)	.001 (.002)	.003*** (.000)	-.21*** (.03)	-.32*** (.03)	2.85 (.06)
<b>Medicare</b> (N=367) Wald Chi-sq=130.4, p=.00	.05 (.08)	.003 (.002)	.005*** (.000)	-.06 (.05)	-.25*** (.07)	1.48 (.13)
<b>Moral Issues</b> (N=367) Wald Chi-sq=71.7, p=.00	-.00 (.15)	.011** (.005)	-.001 (.000)	.36*** (.08)	.71*** (.10)	1.63 (.12)
<b>Social Security</b> (N=367) Wald Chi-sq=137.1, p=.00	.11 (.09)	-.002 (.004)	.003*** (.000)	.00 (.05)	-.33*** (.06)	.80 (.09)
<b>Taxes</b> (N=367) Wald Chi-sq=34.2, p=.00	.14 (.11)	.008* (.004)	.001*** (.000)	.15** (.07)	.09 (.07)	2.19 (.11)
<b>Welfare</b> (N= 367) Wald Chi-sq=118.9, p=.00	.02 (.14)	.000 (.008)	.004*** (.000)	-.16*** (.05)	-.15*** (.06)	.88 (.10)

*Note: The table reports negative binomial regression coefficients (with robust standard errors in parentheses) for Model 2 of Table 2. The dependent variable for each model is a count of legislators' introductions and cosponsorships on a particular issue. Ns vary due to partial advertising data for some sampled legislators. The corporate regulations model is limited to 2002. \*\*\* = p < .01; \*\* = p < .05; \* = p < .10*

<b>TABLE 2, MODEL 3</b>	<b>Mention Self?</b>	<b>Mention Opp.?</b>	<b>Policy Acts</b>	<b>2000 Election</b>	<b>2002 Election</b>	<b>Constant</b>
<b>Agriculture</b> (N=368)	.47***	-.13	.002***	-.31***	-.33***	1.40
Wald Chi-sq=85.8, p=.00	(.11)	(.32)	(.000)	(.08)	(.08)	(.11)
<b>Budget</b> (N = 370)	.15	.19	.000	-.26***	-.16	.96
Wald Chi-sq=14.3, p=.01	(.10)	(.15)	(.000)	(.10)	(.12)	(.16)
<b>Campaign Finance</b> (N = 369)	.10	-.02	.002***	-.11	-1.24***	.54
Wald Chi-sq=124.9, p=.00	(.13)	(.26)	(.000)	(.08)	(.13)	(.11)
<b>Children's Issues</b> (N=368)	.45***	.26	.005***	-1.26***	-.67***	-2.01
Wald Chi-sq=175.2, p=.00	(.17)	(.56)	(.000)	(.18)	(.16)	(.33)
<b>Civil Rights</b> (N=368)	.58**	.61**	.006***	-.27***	.05	.27
Wald Chi-sq=n/a	(.28)	(.30)	(.001)	(.07)	(.09)	(.19)
<b>Consumer Issues</b> (N=368)	.34***	-.29***	.004***	-.32***	-.40***	.98
Wald Chi-sq=128.9, p=.00	(.13)	(.11)	(.000)	(.06)	(.08)	(.12)
<b>Corp. Regulations</b> (N=118)	.28**	.39***	.002***	---	---	.60
Wald Chi-sq=68.4, p=.00	(.11)	(.10)	(.001)			(.13)
<b>Crime</b> (N=369)	.14***	-.01	.004***	.14***	.32***	1.56
Wald Chi-sq =113.2, p=.00	(.05)	(.08)	(.000)	(.05)	(.05)	(.11)
<b>Defense</b> (N=368)	.02	.18**	.005***	.12***	.18***	2.41
Wald Chi-sq=161.5, p=.00	(.06)	(.09)	(.000)	(.03)	(.04)	(.10)
<b>Education</b> (N=370)	.15***	.02	.005***	.02	-.01	1.24
Wald Chi-sq=156.9, p=.00	(.06)	(.09)	(.000)	(.05)	(.06)	(.11)
<b>Environment</b> (N=369)	.39***	.02	.004***	-.16***	-.41***	1.90
Wald Chi-sq=143.6, p=.00	(.08)	(.17)	(.001)	(.05)	(.06)	(.12)
<b>Health</b> (N=368)	.19***	-.05	.005***	-.07*	-.08*	1.89
Wald Chi-sq=261.6, p=.00	(.05)	(.08)	(.000)	(.04)	(.05)	(.11)
<b>Jobs and Infrastructure</b> (N=372)	.05*	.01	.003***	-.21***	-.32***	2.85
Wald Chi-sq=254.0, p=.00	(.03)	(.05)	(.000)	(.03)	(.03)	(.06)
<b>Medicare</b> (N=368)	.10*	.11	.005***	-.05	-.25***	1.47
Wald Chi-sq=133.5, p=.00	(.06)	(.09)	(.000)	(.05)	(.06)	(.13)
<b>Moral Issues</b> (N=370)	.33*	-.06	-.001*	.36***	.71***	1.64
Wald Chi-sq=65.1, p=.00	(.17)	(.18)	(.000)	(.08)	(.10)	(.12)
<b>Social Security</b> (N=370)	.07	.01	.003***	.01	-.32***	.79
Wald Chi-sq=139.1, p=.00	(.06)	(.08)	(.000)	(.05)	(.06)	(.09)
<b>Taxes</b> (N=371)	.36***	-.05	.001***	.13**	.07	2.20
Wald Chi-sq=34.9, p=.00	(.07)	(.08)	(.000)	(.06)	(.06)	(.11)
<b>Welfare</b> (N=368)	.02	-.19	.004***	-.16***	-.14**	.89
Wald Chi-sq=121.6, p=.00	(.08)	(.23)	(.000)	(.05)	(.06)	(.10)

*Note: The table reports negative binomial regression coefficients (with robust standard errors in parentheses) for Model 3 of Table 2. The dependent variable for each model is a count of legislators' introductions and cosponsorships on a particular issue. Ns vary due to partial advertising data for some sampled legislators. The corporate regulations model is limited to 2002. \*\*\* = p < .01; \*\* = p < .05; \* = p < .10*

<b>TABLE 2, MODEL 4</b>	<b>Mention Issue?</b>	<b>Specific Appeal?</b>	<b>Policy Acts</b>	<b>2000 Election</b>	<b>2002 Election</b>	<b>Constant</b>
<b>Agriculture</b> (N=371)	.42***	.04	.003***	-.31***	-.33***	1.41
Wald Chi-sq=85.3, p=.00	(.15)	(.19)	(.000)	(.08)	(.08)	(.11)
<b>Budget</b> (N=372)	.44***	-.25	.001	-.25***	-.16	.92
Wald Chi-sq=16.6, p=.01	(.16)	(.18)	(.000)	(.10)	(.13)	(.15)
<b>Campaign Finance</b> (N=369)	.12	.03	.002***	-.11	-1.24***	.4
Wald Chi-sq=126.2, p=.00	(.18)	(.24)	(.000)	(.08)	(.13)	(.11)
<b>Children's Issues</b> (N=368)	-.31**	.99***	.005***	-.48***	-.24***	-.06
Wald Chi-sq=189.3, p=.00	(.14)	(.20)	(.001)	(.07)	(.08)	(.14)
<b>Civil Rights</b> (N=368)	.28	1.08***	.006***	-.28***	.05	.25
Wald Chi-sq=141.5, p=.00	(.19)	(.24)	(.001)	(.07)	(.09)	(.19)
<b>Consumer Issues</b> (N=368)	.18	.15	.004***	-.33***	-.40***	.98
Wald Chi-sq=132.0, p=.00	(.32)	(.34)	(.000)	(.06)	(.08)	(.12)
<b>Corp. Regulations</b> (N=120)	.16	.19	.002***	---	---	.61
Wald Chi-sq=42.5, p=.00	(.20)	(.19)	(.001)			(.13)
<b>Crime</b> (N=371)	.12	.01	.004***	.14***	.31***	1.55
Wald Chi-sq=111.8, p=.00	(.11)	(.11)	(.000)	(.05)	(.05)	(.11)
<b>Defense</b> (N=368)	.05	-.04	.005***	.12***	.18***	2.41
Wald Chi-sq=185.9, p=.00	(.06)	(.09)	(.000)	(.03)	(.04)	(.10)
<b>Education</b> (N=376)	.24***	-.08	.005***	.02	-.02	1.22
Wald Chi-sq=174.2, p=.00	(.07)	(.08)	(.000)	(.05)	(.06)	(.11)
<b>Environment</b> (N=373)	.45***	-.09	.004***	-.18***	-.41***	1.90
Wald Chi-sq=147.8, p=.00	(.10)	(.13)	(.000)	(.05)	(.06)	(.11)
<b>Health</b> (N=373)	.12	.07	.005***	-.07*	-.08*	1.87
Wald Chi-sq=256.7, p=.00	(.07)	(.07)	(.000)	(.04)	(.05)	(.11)
<b>Jobs and Infrastructure</b> (N=367)	.04	.02	.003***	-.20***	-.30***	2.83
Wald Chi-sq=167.5, p=.00	(.04)	(.04)	(.000)	(.03)	(.03)	(.06)
<b>Medicare</b> (N=377)	.03	.13	.005***	-.09	-.27***	1.49
Wald Chi-sq=129.04, p=.00	(.08)	(.09)	(.000)	(.06)	(.07)	(.13)
<b>Moral Issues</b> (N=371)	.52***	-.33	-.001*	.37***	.71***	1.64
Wald Chi-sq=72.3, p=.00	(.14)	(.21)	(.000)	(.08)	(.10)	(.12)
<b>Social Security</b> (N=375)	.08	.01	.003***	.01	-.31***	.77
Wald Chi-sq=132.8, p=.00	(.06)	(.07)	(.000)	(.05)	(.06)	(.09)
<b>Taxes</b> (N=375)	.35***	-.06	.001***	.14**	.07	2.19
Wald Chi-sq=31.7, p=.00	(.08)	(.08)	(.000)	(.06)	(.06)	(.11)
<b>Welfare</b> (N=368)	.00	.03	.004***	-.16***	-.15***	.88
Wald Chi-sq=121.2, p=.00	(.10)	(.14)	(.000)	(.05)	(.06)	(.10)

*Note: The table reports negative binomial regression coefficients (with robust standard errors in parentheses) for Model 4 of Table 2. The dependent variable for each model is a count of legislators' introductions and cosponsorships on a particular issue. Ns vary due to partial advertising data for some sampled legislators. The corporate regulations model is limited to 2002. \*\*\* = p < .01; \*\* = p < .05; \* = p < .10*

<b>TABLE 3, MODEL 1</b>	<b>% of Past Activity</b>	<b>Constituency</b>	<b>2000 Election</b>	<b>2002 Election</b>	<b>Constant</b>
<b>Agriculture</b> (N=287) Wald Chi-sq=34.1, p=.00	.16*** (.06)	.03*** (.01)	-.06 (.51)	.57 (.49)	-4.01 (.51)
<b>Budget</b> (N=290) Wald Chi-sq=26.4, p=.00	.25*** (.09)	---	-.46* (.27)	-1.30*** (.37)	-.65 (.28)
<b>Campaign Finance</b> (N=287) Wald Chi-sq=2.09, p=.01	.17 (.13)	---	.17 (.53)	-.09 (.65)	-2.90 (.54)
<b>Children's Issues</b> (N=285) Wald Chi-sq=6.8, p=.15	.44* (.26)	-.18** (.09)	-1.02 (.88)	-.19 (.83)	.94 (2.17)
<b>Civil Rights</b> (N=285) Wald Chi-sq=12.6, p=.00	.37 (.30)	-.04 (.03)	---	---	-2.69 (2.59)
<b>Consumer Issues</b> (N=285) Wald Chi-sq=9.1, p=.03	.32** (.16)	---	.13 (.56)	-.93 (.97)	-4.23 (.74)
<b>Corp. Regulations</b> (N=85) Wald Chi-sq=7.6, p=.02	.30 (.19)	.08** (.03)	---	---	-4.87 (1.47)
<b>Crime</b> (N=289) Wald Chi-sq=34.2, p=.00	.11** (.04)	.03*** (.01)	-1.00*** (.31)	-1.34*** (.38)	-.41 (.44)
<b>Defense</b> (N=285) Wald Chi-sq=59.2, p=.00	.06* (.03)	.85** (.36)	-.19 (.36)	2.04*** (.39)	-2.98 (.58)
<b>Education</b> (N=298) Wald Chi-sq=14.6, p=.01	.15*** (.05)	.11* (.06)	-.15 (.28)	-.52* (.31)	-2.71* (1.51)
<b>Environment</b> (N=290) Wald Chi-sq=22.5, p=.00	.18*** (.04)	---	-.22 (.33)	.25 (.37)	-3.15 (.45)
<b>Health</b> (N=291) Wald Chi-sq=25.8, p=.00	.13*** (.03)	---	.81*** (.30)	.66** (.33)	-2.15 (.41)
<b>Jobs and Infrastructure</b> (N=296) Wald Chi-sq=27.3, p=.00	.03 (.03)	.04** (.02)	-.40 (.28)	.99*** (.32)	.99 (1.01)
<b>Medicare</b> (N=295) Wald Chi-sq=24.3, p=.00	.06 (.05)	.21*** (.06)	.96*** (.29)	1.09*** (.31)	-3.58 (.85)
<b>Moral Issues</b> (N=287) Wald Chi-sq=10.4, p=.02	.23*** (.07)	---	-.20 (.53)	-.46 (.63)	-3.17 (.46)
<b>Social Security</b> (N=295) Wald Chi-sq=14.9, p=.00	.06 (.12)	.06 (.04)	-.93*** (.30)	-.94*** (.30)	.26 (.58)
<b>Taxes</b> (N=293) Wald Chi-sq=19.0, p=.00	.09*** (.03)	.01 (.01)	-.55** (.28)	-.45 (.30)	-1.17 (.65)
<b>Welfare</b> (N=287) Wald Chi-sq=12.2, p=.02	.00 (.14)	.00 (.01)	-1.01** (.43)	-1.61*** (.59)	-1.75 (1.08)

*Note: The table reports logistic regression coefficients (with robust standard errors in parentheses) for Model 1 of Table 3. The dependent variable for all models is a dummy for whether or not a candidate raised a particular issue in reference to him- or herself. Ns vary due to partial advertising data for some sampled legislators. It was necessary to exclude the dummies for election year to specify the model for civil rights. The corporate regulations model is limited to 2002. \*\*\* = p < .01; \*\* = p < .05; \* = p < .10*

<b>TABLE 3, MODEL 2</b>	<b>% of Past Activity</b>	<b>Constituency</b>	<b>2000 Election</b>	<b>2002 Election</b>	<b>Constant</b>
<b>Agriculture</b> (N=285)	-.29***	.07***	---	---	-7.30
Wald Chi-sq=63.6, p=.00	(.06)	(.01)			(1.00)
<b>Budget</b> (N=287)	-.01	---	-.08	-1.50	-2.90
Wald Chi-sq=1.0, p=.59	(.20)		(.63)	(1.14)	(.64)
<b>Campaign Finance</b> (N=286)	-.54	---	-.56	.33	-3.46
Wald Chi-sq=22.6, p=.00	(.48)		(1.27)	(1.37)	(1.23)
<b>Children's Issues</b> (N=285)	-.88	-.00	---	---	-4.08
Wald Chi-sq=1.2, p=.55	(1.25)	(.04)			(2.41)
<b>Civil Rights</b> (N=NA)	---	---	---	---	---
Wald Chi-sq=NA, p=NA					
<b>Consumer Issues</b> (N=285)	.28	---	---	---	-5.83
Wald Chi-sq=2.4, p=.13	(.18)				(.96)
<b>Corp. Regulations</b> (N=84)	.27**	.06	---	---	-6.33
Wald Chi-sq=8.0, p=.02	(.12)	(.04)			(1.87)
<b>Crime</b> (N=285)	-.05	.03	-.47	-.44	-1.83
Wald Chi-sq=2.1, p=.72	(.05)	(.18)	(.45)	(.50)	(.50)
<b>Defense</b> (N=285)	.14**	-.17	-.53	1.13	-6.61
Wald Chi-sq=7.2, p=.13	(.06)	(.80)	(1.51)	(1.09)	(1.54)
<b>Education</b> (N=287)	-.01	-.04	-.15	-1.39**	-.70
Wald Chi-sq=5.0, p=.29	(.07)	(.10)	(.41)	(.67)	(2.63)
<b>Environment</b> (N=286)	.03	---	.32	.62	-4.14
Wald Chi-sq=.9, p=.82	(.10)		(.94)	(.89)	(.94)
<b>Health</b> (N=285)	.01	---	1.21**	.91	-3.54
Wald Chi-sq=4.0, p=.26	(.05)		(.61)	(.72)	(.77)
<b>Jobs and Infrastructure</b> (N=287)	.09	.03	-.12	1.37*	-3.76
Wald Chi-sq=6.6, p=.16	(.06)	(.02)	(.86)	(.82)	(1.40)
<b>Medicare</b> (N=285)	.06	.19**	1.53**	1.43**	-6.33
Wald Chi-sq=17.9, p=.00	(.08)	(.08)	(.66)	(.68)	(1.07)
<b>Moral Issues</b> (N=286)	.12	---	-1.37*	-.39	-2.92
Wald Chi-sq=13.2, p=.00	(.09)		(.73)	(.74)	(.41)
<b>Social Security</b> (N=286)	.10	.14**	-.87*	-.42	-3.50
Wald Chi-sq=7.9, p=.10	(.17)	(.07)	(.45)	(.44)	(.88)
<b>Taxes</b> (N=289)	.04	-.01	-.75**	-.15	-1.10
Wald Chi-sq=6.2, p=.18	(.03)	(.02)	(.36)	(.40)	(.83)
<b>Welfare</b> (N=285)	-.65	-.08	---	---	.29
Wald Chi-sq=7.4, p=.02	(.68)	(.10)			(2.47)

*Note: The table reports logistic regression coefficients (with robust standard errors in parentheses) for Model 2 of Table 3. The dependent variable for all models is a dummy for whether or not a candidate criticized the opponent on a particular issue. Ns vary due to partial advertising data for some sampled legislators. It was necessary to exclude the dummies for election year to specify the models for agriculture, children's issues, consumer issues, and welfare. Only one candidate referenced the opponent on civil rights, so no model is estimated for that issue. The corporate regulations model is limited to 2002. \*\*\* = p < .01; \*\* = p < .05; \* = p < .10*

<b>TABLE 3, MODEL 3</b>	<b>% of Past Activity</b>	<b>Constituency</b>	<b>2000 Election</b>	<b>2002 Election</b>	<b>Constant</b>
<b>Agriculture</b> (N=28) F = 3.6, p = .02; R <sup>2</sup> = .17	-.11 (.57)	.04 (.13)	1.27 (2.87)	8.85 (5.19)	8.91 (4.72)
<b>Budget</b> (N=99) F = 1.6, p = .21; R <sup>2</sup> = .07	1.51* (.77)	---	-1.40 (2.16)	-4.54 (3.16)	14.46 (1.84)
<b>Campaign Finance</b> (N=20) F = 3.7, p = .03; R <sup>2</sup> = .17	.99 (1.34)	---	1.04 (6.67)	-5.98 (5.65)	12.09 (6.82)
<b>Children's Issues</b> (N=11) F = 2.0, p = .17; R <sup>2</sup> = .51	-3.43 (2.58)	-4.63 (6.18)	24.24 (13.39)	-3.91 (12.65)	132.66 (157.68)
<b>Civil Rights</b> (N=5) F = 3.6, p = .02; R <sup>2</sup> = .17	---	---	---	---	---
<b>Consumer Issues</b> (N=11) F = .05, p = .82; R <sup>2</sup> = .00	1.15 (4.94)	---	---	---	41.05 (27.40)
<b>Corp. Regulations</b> (N=22) F = .88, p = .43; R <sup>2</sup> = .08	-.05 (1.13)	.29 (.23)	---	---	2.48 (11.58)
<b>Crime</b> (N=83) F = 2.4, p = .06; R <sup>2</sup> = .09	-1.41* (.84)	.14 (.10)	-6.65** (3.17)	-6.19 (5.17)	34.46 (7.59)
<b>Defense</b> (N=79) F = 1.3, p = .28; R <sup>2</sup> = .04	.34 (.46)	-6.52* (3.48)	-3.73 (7.87)	-2.18 (6.93)	20.14 (11.38)
<b>Education</b> (N=181) F = 1.7, p = .10; R <sup>2</sup> = .15	.52 (.37)	.46 (.70)	3.14 (2.82)	-1.11 (2.80)	7.71 (18.37)
<b>Environment</b> (N=50) F = .42, p = .73; R <sup>2</sup> = .03	.29 (.36)	---	2.55 (3.62)	2.39 (4.60)	14.41 (4.48)
<b>Health</b> (N=133) F = 3.4, p = .02; R <sup>2</sup> = .09	1.08** (.52)	---	1.90 (3.57)	-2.50 (4.13)	9.35 (6.88)
<b>Jobs and Infrastructure</b> (N=135) F = 1.7, p = .16; R <sup>2</sup> = .03	-.19 (.31)	.23 (.16)	4.04 (3.40)	2.01 (3.31)	31.58 (12.14)
<b>Medicare</b> (N=156) F = 7.0, p = .00; R <sup>2</sup> = .19	.19 (.35)	1.02*** (.38)	11.91*** (2.46)	5.18*** (1.85)	.16 (5.66)
<b>Moral Issues</b> (N=24) F = 1.8, p = .17; R <sup>2</sup> = .23	1.45** (.68)	---	17.21 (12.70)	-3.71 (3.42)	5.17 (2.68)
<b>Social Security</b> (N=176) F = 1.7, p = .16; R <sup>2</sup> = .03	-.22 (.69)	.39 (.24)	.83 (1.56)	-2.40 (1.88)	15.10 (3.03)
<b>Taxes</b> (N=138) F = 1.1, p = .35; R <sup>2</sup> = .02	.05 (.24)	.05 (.11)	-3.92 (2.64)	-3.72 (2.44)	19.68 (7.24)
<b>Welfare</b> (N=33) F = 4.2, p = .08; R <sup>2</sup> = .34	.85 (.95)	.23** (.11)	9.66** (3.99)	.20 (3.34)	1.67 (5.16)

*Note: The table reports OLS regression coefficients (with robust standard errors in parentheses) for Model 3 of Table 3. The dependent variable for all models is candidate's advertising time on a particular issue. Analyses are limited to the group of candidates who raised the issue. Ns vary due to partial advertising data for some sampled legislators. It was necessary to exclude the dummies for election year to specify the model for consumer issues, and, because the low N yielded perfect predictions, it was not possible to estimate a model for civil rights. The corporate regulations model is limited to 2002. \*\*\* = p < .01; \*\* = p < .05; \* = p < .10*

<b>TABLE 3, MODEL 4</b>	<b>% of Past Activity</b>	<b>Constituency</b>	<b>2000 Election</b>	<b>2002 Election</b>	<b>Constant</b>
<b>Agriculture</b> (N=30)	-.05	-.09***	-.85	-.75	5.98
Wald Chi-sq=9.0, p=.06	(.14)	(.03)	(1.28)	(1.32)	(1.93)
<b>Budget</b> (N=103)	-.09	---	-.40	-2.60	3.04
Wald Chi-sq=12.2, p=.01	(.25)		(.82)	(.79)	(.81)
<b>Campaign Finance</b> (N=21)	.14	---	-1.58	-1.56	1.36
Wald Chi-sq=3.8, p=.28	(.42)		(1.60)	(1.75)	(2.05)
<b>Children's Issues</b> (N=11)	---	---	---	---	---
Wald Chi-sq=NA, p=NA					
<b>Civil Rights</b> (N=5)	---	---	---	---	---
Wald Chi-sq=NA, p=NA					
<b>Consumer Issues</b> (N=11)	.54	---	---	---	-1.46
Wald Chi-sq=.90, p=.34	(.57)				(1.98)
<b>Corp. Regulations</b> (N=24)	-.31	-.05	---	---	3.84
Wald Chi-sq=1.7, p=.42	(.26)	(.05)			(2.68)
<b>Crime</b> (N=85)	-.22	.01	.01	1.20	3.28
Wald Chi-sq=6.0, p=.20	(.14)	(.02)	(.68)	(1.12)	(1.20)
<b>Defense</b> (N=79)	.04	-.35	-.29	-1.18	.46
Wald Chi-sq=3.9, p=.42	(.05)	(.55)	(.70)	(.72)	(.80)
<b>Education</b> (N=189)	-.01	.04	.31	-.79*	.41
Wald Chi-sq=7.8, p=.10	(.06)	(.08)	(.44)	(.41)	(2.13)
<b>Environment</b> (N=54)	-.01	---	-.93	.75	1.31
Wald Chi-sq=5.4, p=.15	(.07)		(.65)	(1.15)	(1.10)
<b>Health</b> (N=138)	.05	---	.27	-1.06	1.73
Wald Chi-sq=6.4, p=.09	(.06)		(.86)	(.73)	(1.14)
<b>Jobs and Infrastructure</b> (N=135)	-.19	.01	4.04	2.01	31.57
Wald Chi-sq=1.7, p=.16	(.31)	(.02)	(3.40)	(3.31)	(12.14)
<b>Medicare</b> (N=163)	.14	.03	4.04	4.23	-3.15
Wald Chi-sq=53.0, p=.00	(.12)	(.07)	(.64)	(.70)	(1.28)
<b>Moral Issues</b> (N=26)	-.08	---	.43	-.45	1.69
Wald Chi-sq=1.4, p=.70	(.11)		(1.34)	(1.18)	(.91)
<b>Social Security</b> (N=181)	.17	-.02	.20	-.01	-.05
Wald Chi-sq=2.1, p=.72	(.14)	(.06)	(.33)	(.37)	(.76)
<b>Taxes</b> (N=142)	-.07*	-.03	-.12	.07	2.29
Wald Chi-sq=6.5, p=.17	(.04)	(.02)	(.41)	(.39)	(.95)
<b>Welfare</b> (N=33)	.24	.00	.05	.52	-.58
Wald Chi-sq=.7, p=.95	(.34)	(.03)	(.76)	(1.09)	(1.88)

*Note: The table reports logistic regression coefficients (with robust standard errors in parentheses) for Model 4 of Table 3. The dependent variable for all models is a dummy for whether or not a candidate made a specific claim about a particular issue. Analyses are limited to the group of candidates who did raise the issue. Ns vary due to partial advertising data for some sampled legislators. It was necessary to exclude the dummies for election year to specify the model for consumer issues, and, because the low N yielded perfect predictions, it was not possible to estimate models for civil rights and children's issues. The corporate regulations model is limited to 2002. \*\*\* = p < .01; \*\* = p < .05; \* = p < .10*

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**Table 1. Campaign and Legislative Attention to Issues**

<b>Issue</b>	<b>Number of Candidates</b>	<b>Mean % of Advertising Time</b>	<b>Overall % of Introductions</b>	<b>Mean Number of Activities Undertaken</b>
Agriculture	42	13.9	2.9	6.2
Budget	134	15.9	1.0	2.7
Campaign Finance	27	13.7	1.3	2.0
Children's Issues	16	14.0	1.0	2.5
Civil Rights	6	23.0	1.4	5.7
Consumer Issues	17	24.5	2.6	5.4
Corporate Regulation	28	16.1	1.4	2.9
Crime	120	18.6	5.2	13.7
Defense & Foreign Policy	101	20.2	14.9	39.2
Education	254	24.5	4.9	12.9
Environment	73	18.1	10.1	16.8
Health	178	22.3	7.9	26.2
Jobs & Infrastructure	185	21.3	14.8	30.7
Medicare	207	21.6	4.0	13.6
Moral Issues	40	15.5	1.2	7.0
Social Security	237	19.1	1.4	4.2
Taxes	207	20.8	4.9	14.6
Welfare	39	16.7	2.2	6.0
Gov't Operations			16.8	20.0

*Note: Cell entries report relative attention to each issue in sampled candidates' campaigns in 1998, 2000, and 2002 and legislative activity on each issue in the 106th-108th Congresses.*

**Table 2. Linkages Between Campaign Appeals and Legislative Activity**

	<b>Model 1 Mention Issue?</b>	<b>Model 2 Mention/ Advertising Time</b>	<b>Model 3 Mention Self/ Opponent</b>	<b>Model 4 Mention/ Specific</b>
Agriculture	.44***	.37**/.005	.47***/- .13	.42***/.04
Budget	.22**	.15/.006	.15/.19	.44***/- .25
Campaign Finance	.16	.07/.006	.10/- .02	.12/.03
Children's Issues	.50***	.47**/.002	.45***/.26	-.31**/.99***
Civil Rights	.70***	.82***/- .006*	.58**/.61**	.28/1.08***
Consumer Issues	.29**	.11/.007*	.34***/- .29***	.18/.15
Corporate Regulations	.26**	.09/.012	.28**/.39***	.16/.19
Crime	.13***	.20***/- .004	.14***/- .01	.12/.01
Defense & Foreign Policy	.03	.10*/- .003	.02/.18**	.05/- .04
Education	.17***	.08/.004**	.15***/.02	.24***/- .08
Environment	.39***	.25**/.007	.39***/.02	.45***/- .09
Health	.19***	.10*/.004**	.19***/- .05	.12/.07
Jobs & Infrastructure	.05*	.03/.001	.05*/.01	.04/.02
Medicare	.12**	.05/.003	.10*/.11	.03/.13
Moral Issues	.24*	-.00/.011**	.33*/- .06	.52***/- .33
Social Security	.09*	.11/- .002	.07/.01	.08/.01
Taxes	.32***	.14/.008*	.36***/- .05	.35***/- .06
Welfare	.01	.02/.000	.02/- .19	.00/.03

*Note: The dependent variable in all models is the number of legislative activities undertaken by each legislator on a given issue in the Congress following the campaign of study. Cells report the negative binomial regression coefficients on the variables for discussion of each issue (noted in the column headings). Full results are presented in the Appendix. \*\*\* =  $p < .01$ ; \*\* =  $p < .05$ ; \* =  $p < .10$*

**Table 3. The Effects of Past Activity and Constituency Characteristics on Appeals**

	<b>Model 1 Mention Self Past Acts/ Constituency</b>	<b>Model 2 Mention Opp. Past Acts/ Constituency</b>	<b>Model 3 Ad Time Past Acts/ Constituency</b>	<b>Model 4 Specific Claim Past Acts/ Constituency</b>
Agriculture	.16***/.03***	-.29***/.07***	-.11/.04	-.05/-.09***
Budget	.25***/---	-.01/---	1.51*/---	-.09/---
Campaign Finance	.17/---	-.54/---	.99/---	.14/---
Children's Issues	.44*/-.18**	-.88/-.00	-3.43/-4.63	---
Civil Rights	.37/-.04	---	---	---
Consumer Issues	.32**/---	.28/---	1.15/---	.54/---
Corporate Regulations	.30/.08**	.27**/.06	-.05/.29	-.31/.05
Crime	11**/.03***	-.05/.03	-1.41*/-.14	-.22/.01
Defense & Foreign Policy	.06*/.85**	.14**/-.17	.34/-6.52*	.04/-.35
Education	.15***/.11**	-.01/-.04	.52/.46	-.01/.04
Environment	.18***/---	.03/---	.29/---	-.01/---
Health	.13***/---	.01/---	1.08**/---	.05/---
Jobs & Infrastructure	.03/.04**	.09/.03	-.19/.23	-.19/.01
Medicare	.06/.21***	.06/.19**	.19/1.02***	.14/.03
Moral Issues	.23***/---	.12/---	1.45**/---	-.08/---
Social Security	.06/.06	.10/.14**	-.22/.39	.17/-.02
Taxes	.09***/.01	.04/-.01	.05/.05	-.07*/.03
Welfare	.00/.00	-.65/-.08	.85/.23**	.24/.00

*Note: The dependent variable for each model is listed below the model number in the column heading. Cells report logistic regression coefficients on past activity and constituency characteristics for Models 1, 2, and 4 and OLS coefficients for these variables for Model 3. Full results are presented in the Appendix. \*\*\* = p < .01; \*\* = p < .05; \* = p < .10*

**Table 4. Campaign and Legislative Attention to Issues**

	<b>Model 1</b> # of Issues Raised in Reference to the Candidate	<b>Model 2</b> # of Issues Raised in Reference to the Opponent	<b>Model 3</b> # of Specific Claims on Issues
Tossup Race?	.22*** (.08)	.82*** (.19)	.02 (.07)
Incumbent?	.17** (.07)	-.63*** (.21)	.06 (.06)
Democrat?	-.03 (.05)	.07 (.19)	.12** (.05)
Total Issues	---	.21*** (.04)	.23*** (.01)
2000 Election	-.07 (.06)	-.11 (.19)	.16*** (.05)
2002 Election	.01 (.06)	-.01 (.22)	-.06 (.06)
Constant	1.56 (.05)	-1.34 (.30)	-.12 (.07)
N	369	369	369
Wald Chi-Square	12.2	85.5	644.2
Prob > Chi-Square	.03	.00	.00

*Note: The dependent variable for each model is listed in the column heading. Cells report negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.*

\*\*\* =  $p < .01$ ; \*\* =  $p < .05$ ; \* =  $p < .10$